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In re Parentage of J.M.K.9/15/2005
See, e.g., Sheila A. Malloy, Comment, Washington's Parentage Act: A Step Forward for Children's Rights, 12 Gonz. L. Rev. 455 (1976-77) (the Act's purpose is to give full equality to all children by recognizing their right to parental support and their legal relationship with both parents, citing Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538, 93 S. Ct. 872, 35 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1973) (holding the state could show no constitutionally sufficient justification for refusing to recognize illegitimate children's enforceable right to support from their biological fathers when the state recognized such right with respect to legitimate children); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972) (holding an Illinois statute's irrebuttable presumption that all unmarried fathers were unqualified to raise their children, a violation of the due process clause)). See also, Carol DeNardo Spoor, Comment, Paternity Determinations in Washington: Balancing the Interests of All Parties, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 653 (1984-85) (citing numerous U.S. Supreme Court opinions including Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71, 88 S. Ct. 1509, 20 L. Ed. 2d 436 (1968) (state may not create a right of action for the wrongful death of a parent that is available solely to marital children); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76, 92 S. Ct. 1400, 31 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1972) (state may not exclude non-marital children from sharing equally with other children in workers' compensation benefits following the death of their parent)). Accordingly, we hold that Kepl became the legal (natural) father of JMK 60 days after the paternity affidavit, signed by Brock, the mother, and Kepl, the biological father, was filed.
Lastly, Kepl argues that summary judgment was not appropriate as to his paternity of JMK because there are unresolved issues regarding credibility as to whether Kepl signed the paternity affidavit under blackmail, duress and/or fraud. Under former RCW 26.26.040(1)(e), Kepl has the burden of proof. Based on overwhelming evidence, including the numerous photographs, letters and cards submitted and the undisputed fact of the long-term romantic relationship between the parties, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment determination of paternity of JMK because reasonable minds would not conclude that Kepl signed the paternity affidavit for JMK under fraud, duress and/or blackmail.
We now turn to DRK. Because Kepl did not sign a paternity affidavit for DRK, the legal argument above is not available regarding the paternity of DRK.
Kepl maintains that he cannot be the legal (natural) father of DRK because former RCW 26.26.050(2), the artificial insemination statute, shields him from legal fatherhood status.
A threshold question is whether former RCW 26.26.050 is applicable given that Brock conceived DRK using in vitro fertilization and not through artificial insemination. Brock argues that under former RCW 26.26.050(2), the legislature enacted a provision designed to prevent an unintended paternity through 'artificial insemination.' Brock asserts that, 'by its terms, the statute is limited to the process of 'artificial insemination.'' Requested Supp'l Br. of Pet'r at 3.
Brock correctly notes that the process of artificial insemination is completely different from the process in vitro fertilization. See supra note 2. Because Brock conceived her children through the creation of embryos that were later implanted into Brock's uterus, Brock concludes that under a plain reading of the unambiguous statutory language former RCW 26.26.050(2) does not apply to this case. Brock also cites the commentary to the Uniform Parentage Act, on which the statutory provision is based, which p
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