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In re Parentage of J.M.K.9/15/2005
rovides in part that the Act ''does not deal with many complex and serious legal problems raised by the practice of artificial insemination'' and deals only with one fact situation that occurs frequently -- the artificial insemination with sperm from donors who have no intention of being the father. Requested Supp'l Br. of Pet'r at 4.
Kepl provides two arguments as to why the former artificial insemination statute should apply in this case. First, Kepl claims that former RCW 26.26.050(2) should be read by focusing on the 'purpose' of the donor, and not on the actual method used by the woman to become pregnant. Kepl claims that since 'artificial insemination' is not defined in the statute, a donor, such a Kepl, who donates semen to a licensed physician with a purpose of 'for use' in a woman is entitled to the protection of the statute, regardless of the method actually employed to achieve pregnancy. Alternatively, Kepl argues that if a definition of 'artificial insemination' is required, it is appropriate to consider the current statutory provision of RCW 26.26.011(4). RCW 26.26.011(4) defines 'Assisted reproduction' to mean 'a method of causing pregnancy other than sexual intercourse.' The term includes (a) intrauterine insemination; (b) donation of eggs; (c) donation of embryos; (d) in vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; and (e) intracytoplsmic sperm injection.' Id. Kepl claims that RCW 26.26.011(4) is both curative and remedial and it is thus appropriate to apply the statute retroactively. Kepl relies on Barstad v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 145 Wn.2d 528, 536, 541, 39 P.3d 984 (2002) (applying RCW 48.29.010 retroactively because it is curative and intended by the legislature to apply retroactively).
Neither of Kepl's arguments is persuasive. The first argument requires this court to effectively ignore the terms 'artificial insemination.' Courts are not permitted to simply ignore terms in a statute. Arborwood Idaho, L.L.C. v. City of Kennewick, 151 Wn.2d 359, 367, 89 P.3d 217 (2004) (if the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent).
While Kepl correctly explains the holding in Barstad, his second argument overlooks the legislature's clear intent in this case to apply the revised parentage provisions in chapter 26.26 RCW prospectively. RCW 26.26.904, a transitional provision, provides, '{a} proceeding to adjudicate parentage which was commenced before June 13, 2002, is governed by the law in effect at the time the proceeding was commenced.' Thus, the legislature did not intend the new parentage provisions to apply retroactively. Accordingly, we hold that former RCW 26.26.050(2) is not applicable.
Next, Kepl contends that the trial court lacked authority to order blood tests. Former RCW 26.26.100(1) (1997) provides, in relevant part, that the court may, and upon the request of a party shall, require any alleged or presumed father who has been made a party to submit to blood tests. If a party objects to a proposed court order for blood or genetic tests, the party requesting blood tests must provide testimony stating the facts and the court is then required to order blood tests if it appears that a reasonable possibility exists that the requisite sexual contact occurred. Former RCW 26.26.100. Kepl claims that the court had no authority because former RCW 26.26.050(2) shields him from legal paternity for JMK and DRK. As discussed above, with regards to both JMK and DRK, Kepl does not have recourse to any statutory defenses under former RCW 26.26.050(2).
Furthermore, in response to Brock's parentage petition, Kepl initially claimed that he was not necessarily t
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