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In re Parentage of J.M.K.9/15/2005
he biological father of the two boys because Brock may have been 'impregnated by another donor's sperm' and Kepl himself requested blood testing for paternity of both boys. Given Kepl's shifting legal position, combined with the intimate, sexual relationship between the parties and the inapplicability of former RCW 26.26.050, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Kepl to submit to blood tests.
As noted earlier, genetic testing here indicates a 98 percent or greater probability that Kepl is DRK's biological father. There is no dispute as to the procedures or accuracy of the genetic testing. Thus, under former RCW 26.26.040(1)(g), Kepl is presumed to be the natural father of DRK. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment determination that Kepl is the legal (natural) father of DRK.
Kepl also claims that the trial court erred in requiring Kepl to pay child support and to provide tax returns because he is not the natural father under former RCW 26.26.050(2). Because we hold that Kepl is the natural father for both boys, Kepl's claims are without merit. Orders setting forth child support obligations in paternity actions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Partlow v. Law, 39 Wn. App. 173, 178, 692 P.2d 863 (1984). RCW 26.26.130(2) provides that the judgment and order regarding parentage shall contain provisions concerning the duty of future and current child support. Kepl makes no claim that the amount of support determined by the court was not reasonable or that the court failed to consider relevant factors. RCW 26.26.130(6) (after considering all relevant factors, the court shall order either or both parents to pay an amount determined pursuant to the schedule and standards contained in chapter 26.19 RCW). The record contains the Washington State Child Support Schedule Worksheets used to determine the support payments. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining child support.
ATTORNEY FEES
Kepl also contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to pay $3,500 of Brock's $5,000 in attorney fees. Kepl claims that the trial court should be reversed because both the superior court commissioner and the trial court failed to enter findings and conclusions in support of the temporary order and in support of the order denying motion for revision of the order granting attorney's fees and child support. Kepl claims that the lack of findings and conclusions prevents effective review and constitutes reversible error, citing In re Estate of Larson, 103 Wn.2d 517, 520 n.1, 694 P.2d 1051 (1985). Kepl's argument is not persuasive.
In Larson, a case involving a dispute over attorney fees incurred in the probate of an estate, the court noted in a footnote that 'superior courts, in reviewing decisions of court commissioners pursuant to RCW 2.24.050, should enter . . . findings of fact and conclusions of law into the record.' Larson, 103 Wn.2d at 520 n.1. However, the court did not hold that failure to enter findings of fact and/or conclusions of law prevents effective review in all cases or constitutes reversible error. In this case, RCW 26.26.140 provides that '{t}he court may order that all or a portion of a party's reasonable attorney's fees be paid by another party.' The trial court is granted broad discretion in determining an award of attorney fees under RCW 26.26.140. State ex rel. T.A.W. v. Weston, 66 Wn. App. 140, 831 P.2d 771 (1992). We will not disturb the trial court's award unless it was manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Fernando v. Nieswandt, 87 Wn. App. 103, 110, 940 P.2d 1380 (1997).
Looking at the record as a whole, we cannot
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