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Ramey v. Knorr10/17/2005
is based on an objective standard. When the occurrence of an illness or loss of consciousness should have been reasonably foreseen by a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence, the driver of a motor vehicle is negligent as a matter of law. 'The negligence is not in the manner of driving but rather in driving at all, if the person should reasonably have foreseen that the illness or lack of consciousness might occur and affect the person's manner of driving.'
The Wisconsin cases provide several examples defining notice and forewarning. In Jankee, the court declared that forewarning exists when a person is under the treatment of medication. The court discussed Stuyvesant Assoc. v. John Doe to illustrate when forewarning is satisfied with regard to taking medication. In Stuyvesant Assoc., a schizophrenic man was receiving injections every other week for his illness and knew if he missed an injection, deterioration would result. The defendant also knew of the risks he posed if he fell into a psychotic state. The defendant missed an appointment for his medication and committed vandalism while in a psychotic state. 'The court held the defendant to an objective standard of care and found him liable, reasoning that the patient was cognizant of his condition and the risks posed by refraining from the medication . . . .'
In Johnson v. Lambotte, the defendant was being treated for 'chronic schizophrenic state of paranoid type' when she left the hospital and having little or no apparent control of her vehicle, collided with another car. In Breunig, the court stated that 'Johnson is not a case of sudden mental seizure with no forewarning {because the} defendant knew she was being treated for a mental disorder and hence would not have come under the non-liability rule herein stated.'
In addition, symptoms of a mental disability provide adequate notice and forewarning. In Breunig, Mrs. Veith was found to have had notice and forewarning of her mental condition because she had previously experienced delusional visions. The issue of forewarning went to the jury in Breunig because there was not substantial evidence whether Mrs. Veith had knowledge or forewarning. Mrs. Veith was not previously treated for a mental disorder and her friends testified that she was normal for some months prior to the accident.
In the case at hand, Knorr does not meet the test of sudden mental incapacity because the evidence clearly establishes she had notice and forewarning of her mental condition. The testimony at trial showed that in 1994, Knorr had a mental breakdown and was hospitalized for ten days. During that period, Knorr believed the person she worked for was conspiring to steal her and her husband's assets, was going to kill them, and was poisoning her. She also had concerns about her brother being a murderer. The delusions escalated to a point where she believed the neighbors were part of this scheme of 'taking them out.' Knorr was diagnosed with possible delusional disorder, was put on medication, and was advised to see a psychiatrist.
When Knorr was released from the hospital she was given Lithium along with other medication, which helped end her delusional thoughts. The hospital directed Knorr to see a psychiatrist and she saw Dr. McConnaughy. After three months, Knorr quit seeing Dr. McConnaughy and quit taking her medication. Knorr testified at trial that in July of 1994, she 'started to get real anxious again' and had to go back to the hospital. At the admittance office, Knorr 'started snapping out of it' and decided to go back home and see how she felt. When Knorr returned home she felt fine and no longer had anxiety or other symptoms until 2001.
The testimony
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