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Ramey v. Knorr10/17/2005
ordinary care.'
Ramey argues that because Knorr did not lose physical control of her vehicle, she does not meet the second prong of Breunig. However, lack of ordinary care does not only require loss of physical capacity. Lack of ordinary care occurs when there is either an inability to understand and appreciate the duty to drive with ordinary care, or an inability to control the vehicle with ordinary care. Although Knorr was in physical control of her vehicle, her delusional beliefs prevented her from understanding and appreciating her duty to drive with ordinary care. Because Knorr was mentally incapable of conforming to the standards of ordinary care while driving, she meets the second prong of Breunig.
Knorr relies, in part, on Washington authority that holds that, '{a} driver who becomes suddenly stricken by an unforeseen loss of consciousness, and is unable to control the vehicle, is not chargeable with negligence.' In Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., the doctor did not warn the driver of a bus of the side effects of drowsiness or lassitude, and the court held the driver could not be liable for negligence unless he had 'knowledge of the pill's harmful qualities.' The general rule from Kaiser applies only to a sudden physical incapacity or loss consciousness that is unforeseeable, and has never applied to a mental incapacity with no loss of consciousness. Kaiser is not applicable to the case before us because Knorr remained in physical control of her vehicle and never lost consciousness.
Furthermore, Knorr relies on Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp. to argue the trial court violated her constitutional right to a jury trial by deciding as a matter of law that her mental incapacity was not sudden. Knorr contends that under Sofie all disputed issues of fact must be decided by a jury. Knorr further argues that because pre-trial the trial court ruled there was an issue of fact whether Knorr's mental incapacity was sudden, the issue should have been sent to a jury. Knorr's argument is misplaced. First, Sofie held there was a constitutional right for the jury to determine the amount of non-economic damages. Second, whether there is substantial evidence to create an issue of fact for the jury is a question of law.
After hearing all of the evidence, the trial court properly ruled as a matter of law that there was not substantial evidence to present an issue of fact for the jury under the sudden mental incapacity defense.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Knorr next argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment. We disagree.
A motion for summary judgment may be granted when there is 'no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' The standard of review for a summary judgment order is de novo, applying the same inquiry as the trial court, and viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Both Ramey and Knorr moved for summary judgment and the trial court denied both motions. The trial court ruled '{t}here is a genuine issue of material fact that must be presented to the jury on the question of the extent to which a reasonable person would, given her prior mental health issues, and her conduct on the days immediately preceding her attempted suicide.'
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ramey before trial, the trial court correctly denied Knorr's motion for summary judgment. Pre-trial, there was a genuine issue of material fact whether Knorr's mental state on the day of the accident would fall under the sudden mental incapacity exception, assuming Washington would adopt th
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