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United States Steel Corp. v. McBrayer3/4/2005
ng the employer's postjudgment motion in its entirety. Of course, that order is a nullity under our law. E.g., Moragne v. Moragne, [Ms. 2020833, March 5, 2004] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2004). Although the employer has requested that this court "reinvest" the trial court with jurisdiction so that the trial court may validly grant its postjudgment motion, it cites no authority for such a procedure, and we agree with the employee that remanding of the cause for that purpose is not permissible under Alabama precedents. While an appellate court may, within its discretion, remand a cause for the entry of a final judgment when an appeal has been taken prematurely (see Foster v. Greer & Sons, Inc., 446 So. 2d 605 (Ala. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Ex parte Andrews, 520 So. 2d 507 (Ala. 1987)), the judgment under review in this case is not susceptible to such a procedure. The trial court's judgment of July 29, 2003, is a final judgment, and because the employer's postjudgment motion was automatically denied, we must now proceed to address the appeal on its merits.
One of the issues raised by the employer concerns the propriety of the trial court's TPD award for the month of June 2001. In his brief, counsel for the employee has graciously conceded that the trial court erred in awarding both TTD and TPD benefits with respect to the month of June 2001. In light of counsel's candid admission of error, in awarding both TTD and TPD benefits with respect to the same time period, we conclude that the portion of the trial court's judgment awarding TPD benefits for June 2001 is due to be reversed.
The employer has raised three additional issues on appeal. As in its postjudgment motion, the employer contends on appeal (1) that the employee is not entitled to TTD benefits with respect to particular days during the recovery period during which he worked on a full-time basis; (2) that the employee is not entitled to TTD benefits for periods during which "unrelated" medical conditions prevented him from working; and (3) that the employee is not entitled to TTD benefits for that portion of the recovery period after the date upon which the employee was released by Dr. Matthew Berchuck to return to work (March 25, 2002).
In addressing those issues, we are governed by the standard of review applicable to workers' compensation judgments generally. We will not reverse a trial court's judgment based on factual findings in a workers' compensation case if those findings are supported by "substantial evidence." Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-81(e)(2). "Substantial evidence" is "'evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.'" Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc., 680 So. 2d 262, 268 (Ala. 1996) (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)). The trial court's legal conclusions, however, are afforded no presumption of correctness, and this court reviews those conclusions de novo. See Ex parte Cash, 624 So. 2d 576 (Ala. 1993); see also Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-81(e)(1).
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that our disposition of the TPD award leaves for review a judgment that awards only TTD benefits -- the trial court awarded no permanent-disability benefits because that court determined that the employee had suffered no vocational disability as a result of the events of December 30, 2000. A TTD award, by its nature, is an award of benefits under the Act that may be said to have three defining attributes. First, it is made in respect of a disability, i.e., an inability during the healing process to perform the work that an
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