Ex parte Flexible Products Co.6/3/2005
en actually litigated in the prior action; and, (3) the resolution of the issue must have been necessary to the prior judgment. Conley, supra."
Martin v. Reed, 480 So. 2d 1180, 1182 (Ala. 1985). Although the federal courts have held that mutuality -- the requirement that the parties in both actions are the same -- is no longer a prerequisite, Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), Alabama continues to require that a party may be barred from relitigating an issue, such as duty or breach, only if that issue has previously been found adversely to that same party. Smith v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 653 So. 2d 933, 934 (Ala. 1995). See also Unum Life Ins. Co. of America v. Wright, 897 So. 2d 1059, 1077 (Ala. 2004).
However, it should be noted that in Jones v. Blanton, 644 So. 2d 882, 886 (Ala. 1994), this Court questioned the necessity for the so-called rule of "mutuality of estoppel." In that case, Jones, the executrix of an estate, brought a legal-malpractice action against Blanton, the attorney who had represented the estate in a will contest and who had entered into a settlement with the parties contesting the will. The trial court granted Blanton's motion for a summary judgment, and Jones appealed. The Court described the circumstances of the case as follows:
"Jones sued under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act (ALSLA), ยง 6-5-570 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, alleging that Blanton had breached his duty to comply with the standard of care required of attorneys in this state and that Wood's estate suffered a loss as a result of Blanton's breach of duty. The underlying action was a contest of Wood's will, in which Blanton represented Jones as the proponent of the will. Blanton negotiated a settlement, in which the contestants agreed to release Jones and the estate from all claims in return for $40,000. Jones was present when Blanton read that agreement in open court on November 7, 1990, and she did not object when the court asked, 'Is that the agreement of the proponents of the will?' However, Jones subsequently refused to comply with the provisions of the agreement. She failed even to appear at a hearing on the contestants' motion to enforce the settlement agreement. At the hearing, the trial judge ordered Jones to comply with the agreement.
"Jones then claimed that Blanton had exceeded his authority as her attorney in negotiating the settlement, that she had never authorized him to enter into such an agreement, and, therefore, that she should not be bound by that agreement. In Jones v. Stedman, 595 So. 2d 1355 (Ala. 1992), this Court, with an opinion by Justice Kennedy, affirmed the trial court's denial of Jones's Rule 59(e), Ala.R.Civ.P., motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order enforcing the settlement agreement. That opinion accepted the trial court's implicit finding that because Jones was present when the settlement agreement was announced in open court and failed to object to it, Blanton had the apparent authority to settle the dispute with the contestants. Jones was therefore bound by the agreement. ...
"'....'
"In this case, Jones, as executrix of the Wood estate, is suing Blanton because of what she calls 'willful and wrongful actions, failures, omissions, breaches of duty, breaches of conduct, insult, malice, neglect, and other stated wrongs' and 'violation of the standard of care applicable to an attorney at law.' These actions and this violation, she claims, proximately caused a loss to the estate. ...
"The sole basis for this action, as Jones admits in her brief, is her contention that Blanton entered into the settlement without proper authority. Because this Court has previously affirmed a trial c
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