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Ferguson v. Baptist Health System2/11/2005
amount of $200,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $800,000. The trial judge entered a judgment for those amounts, and Baptist timely filed a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, for a new trial or a remittitur. The trial judge denied Baptist's motion for a judgment as a matter of law as to the wantonness claim and the punitive-damages award, concluding that the jury could have concluded from the evidence that Baptist "through its agents acted with a conscious disregard for the safety of Mr. Ferguson in failing to monitor his medication, knowing that such failure could result in Dilantin toxicity." The judge concluded, however, that certain occurrences at trial had improperly influenced the amount of the compensatory-damages award, and that that award should be reduced to $25,000 and further found that the punitive- damages award should be reduced to $50,000. Ferguson was allowed 30 days to accept the remittitur or else a new trial would be granted. Ferguson timely filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate that judgment, which was denied by order entered August 11, 2003. In that same order, the trial judge ruled that because Ferguson had failed to accept the remittitur, Baptist's motion for a new trial was granted. Ferguson appealed and Baptist cross-appealed.
Although the parties raise numerous issues in their briefs to this Court, one issue is dispositive: whether there was clear and convincing evidence of wantonness on the part of Baptist so as to authorize the imposition of punitive damages. In Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Trzcinski, 682 So. 2d 17 (Ala. 1996), we discussed these pertinent principles:
"The motion for a J.N.O.V.[ ] is a procedural device used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict. See, Rule 50(b), [Ala.] R. Civ. P.; Luker v. City of Brantley, 520 So. 2d 517 (Ala. 1987). Ordinarily, the denial of a directed verdict or a J.N.O.V. is proper where the nonmoving party has produced substantial evidence to support each element of his claim. However, if punitive damages are at issue in a motion for a directed verdict or a J.N.O.V., then the 'clear and convincing' standard applies. Senn v. Alabama Gas Corp., 619 So. 2d 1320 (Ala. 1993).
"Section 6-11-20(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides that punitive damages may be awarded in tort actions 'where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in ... wantonness' that caused injury to the plaintiff. 'Clear and convincing evidence' is defined in the Code:
"'Evidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a level of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence or the substantial weight of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt.'
"Ala. Code 1975, ยง 6-11-20(b)(4).
"Thus, the 'clear and convincing' standard requires the trial judge to do more than merely determine whether the nonmoving party has presented substantial evidence to support the claim for punitive damages. It is not the trial judge's function when ruling on a directed verdict or J.N.O.V. motion to weigh the evidence; rather, he must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. If in viewing the evidence in that light the judge reasonably can conclude that a jury could find the facts in favor of the non-movant and that the jury could be firmly convinced of that decision after considering the evidence in opposition, then the judge should deny the mo
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