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Searcy Industrial Laundry6/22/2005
Appellants, Searcy Industrial Laundry, Incorporated and Mid-Century Insurance Company, appeal from a decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) awarding appellee Sharon Ferren additional temporary-total-disability benefits. On appeal, appellants argue that appellee's claim for temporary-total-disability benefits was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. They argue, in the alternative, that appellee failed to prove entitlement to temporary-total-disability benefits. We affirm.
On January 13, 2000, appellee sustained an admittedly compensable injury to her back. Four months later, appellee began complaining of a possible cervical-spine injury. Appellants controverted the injury to appellee's cervical spine. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that appellee had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable injury to her cervical spine. The Commission reversed the decision of the ALJ, finding that appellee proved a compensable neck injury by a preponderance of the evidence. Appellants appealed the decision to our court. In Searcy Industrial Laundry Inc. v. Ferren, 82 Ark. App. 69, 110 S.W.3d 306 (2003), we affirmed the decision of the Commission.
Thereafter, appellee filed a claim for additional temporary-total-disability benefits for the period of June 7, 2000, to March 19, 2003. Appellants argued that the claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The ALJ found that the claim was barred. The Commission reversed, finding that the issue of entitlement to temporary-total-disability benefits had not been litigated during the previous proceedings. From that decision comes this appeal.
Appellants argue that appellee's claim for temporary-total-disability benefits is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In support of their argument, appellants raise the following sub-points: (1) appellee is impermissibly seeking to relitigate her claim to temporary-total-disability benefits despite the fact that the same issue was presented and decided upon before; (2) appellee's claim for temporary-total-disability benefits was fully litigated during the hearing, the appeal to the Commission, and the appeal to this court; (3) once affirmed by this court, the Commission's decision after conducting de novo review became a final ruling and is therefore res judicata; (4) no matter what the current position of the Commission is, its original award of benefits to the appellee is final and represents the law of the case for res judicata purposes.
Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, bars relitigation of issues of law or fact previously litigated by a party. Johnson v. Union Pac. R.R., 352 Ark. 534, 104 S.W.3d 745 (2003). The elements of collateral estoppel are: (1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated; (3) it must have been determined by a valid and final judgment; (4) the determination must have been essential to the judgment. Id. Collateral estoppel is applicable to decisions of the Workers' Compensation Commission. See Craven v. Fulton Sanitation Serv., Inc., Ark. , S.W.3d (Apr. 14, 2005).
In finding that the appellee's claim was not barred the Commission wrote the following:
In the present matter, the Full Commission finds that the administrative law judge was correct in finding that the claimant is making the same claim for additional temporary total disability compensation for the exact time frame, based on the same circumstances, as were requested at the hearing in March of 2001. However, we do not find that the claim is barred by the doctrine of res
Page 1 2 Arkansas Personal Injury Attorneys
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