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Arvest Bank Group5/11/2005
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
In January of 2001 Karen Ashcraft sustained a back injury lifting boxes in the course of her employment with Arvest Bank Group, Inc ("Arvest"). Arvest accepted Ashcraft's injury as compensable but disputed the reasonableness and necessity of certain continuing medical treatments administered to Ashcraft. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission-affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)-concluded that Ashcraft was entitled to continuing medical treatment and to temporary total disability benefits from the date such benefits ceased to a date that is yet to be determined. On appeal Arvest contends that the Commission's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed. On cross appeal Ashcraft argues that the Commission erred in its determination that she abandoned her claim of error relating to the ALJ's determination that Arvest was not responsible for any benefits received by Ashcraft from November 26, 2002, until December 5, 2002, because the treatments were not authorized by the ALJ. We affirm on direct appeal and do not reach the merits of Ashcraft's cross appeal because the record presented by Ashcraft is insufficient to demonstrate error.
As to Arvest's claim of error, it is well-settled law that an employer must promptly provide for an injured employee such medical treatment as may be reasonably necessary in connection with the injury received by the employee. Ark. Code Ann. ยง 11-9-508(a) (Repl. 2002). What constitutes reasonably necessary medical treatment is a question of fact for the Commission. Wright Contracting Co. v. Randall, 12 Ark. App. 358, 676 S.W.2d 857 (1987). The Commission has the duty of weighing medical evidence, and, if the evidence is in conflict, determining its resolution is a question of fact for the Commission. Whaley v. Hardee's, 51 Ark. App. 166, 912 S.W.2d 14 (1995). Additionally, the determination of the credibility and weight to be given a witness's testimony is solely within the province of the Commission. Am. Greetings Corp. v. Garey, 61 Ark. App. 18, 963 S.W.2d 613 (1998). In reviewing decisions from the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings, and we affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Smith v. City of Fort Smith, 84 Ark. App. 430, 143 S.W.3d 593 (2004). If reasonable minds could reach the conclusion of the Commission then substantial evidence exists and the Commission's decision must be affirmed. K II Constr. Co. v. Crabtree, 78 Ark. App. 222, 79 S.W.3d 414 (2002). We cannot undertake a de novo review of the evidence and are limited by the standard of review in these cases. Id. at 225, 79 S.W.3d at 416.
There is no dispute that Ashcraft received a compensable injury in January of 2001. After the injury, Ashcraft initially believed she had merely pulled a muscle and continued to work at the bank until May of 2001. She first sought medical treatment on February 18, 2001, when she presented to the emergency room complaining of low-back pain and abdominal pain. She underwent an MRI study that showed a herniated pulposus at L4-L5 and L5-S1. On or about May 17, 2001, she underwent a bilateral diskectomy performed by Dr. Richard Peek. On July 17, 2001, Ashcraft complained to Dr. Peek that she was having "increased pain in her back and down her leg as she did prior to surgery." The complaint prompted Dr. Peek to order a lumbar MRI. This second MRI, performed on July 18, 2001, revealed evidence of epidural scar or granulation tissue at L4-L5 and a persistent diffuse bulge of the disc material at the same level. A mild diffuse bulge
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