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Rice v. Tanner4/6/2005
Appellees have filed motions to dismiss this appeal, arguing that this court lacks jurisdiction because appellants did not timely file their notice of appeal. We deny appellees' motions.
From the nine-volume record that has been filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, it appears that this is a medical malpractice action involving eight defendants. As the case proceeded in the trial court, orders were entered granting summary judgment in favor of two of the defendants. Specifically, on November 12, 2002, the court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Paul Tanner, M.D.; and on June 11, 2003, the court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Cross Ridge Community Hospital.
On August 24, 2004, the court entered the order that is now the subject of dispute, stating in part:
The Court, upon consideration of the motions and briefs filed, arguments of counsel, and other matters, does find that Motions for Summary Judgment of [the remaining six defendants] are granted. This finding is then followed by a paragraph that states: The court directs Attorney Paul McNeill to prepare a precedent based upon the arguments made by the Defendants which are adopted by the Court and submit it to the Court for entry.
This paragraph was followed by the words, IT IS SO ORDERED, after which appears the signature of the circuit judge. Nothing else appears to have been done in the case until entry of the judgment from which appellants are attempting to appeal. It is entitled JUDGMENT, and recites, in pertinent part, the following:
This court has entered its order granting summary judgment on behalf of defendants in this matter. By way of opinion, the court makes the following rulings and findings of fact:
[Paragraphs numbered one (1) through twelve (12) contain detailed findings of fact and discussion of the reasons the court finds that summary judgments are appropriate.] 13. Accordingly, the Court finds that the plaintiffs' argument that this is in effect a change of the law is not valid and is rejected.
14. Accordingly, summary judgment will be entered for all of the defendants, and this case is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of September, 2004.
[Circuit Judge's signature]
In their motions to dismiss the appeal, appellees argue that the order of August 24, 2004, was the relevant order for purposes of commencing the thirty-day window within which appellants were required to file their notice of appeal. Appellees base their argument on the premise that the trial court, in its August 24 order, adopted the arguments made by appellees in their motions for summary judgment and that the trial court "unequivocally granted" the appellees' motions. Appellees also argue that the August 24 order's directive to one of appellees' attorneys to prepare a precedent to be submitted to the court for entry is not the "substantive-type" of action that would render an order not final for purposes of appeal. We do not agree.
The judges who would grant appellees' motions rely upon our decision in White v. Mattingly, Ark. App., S.W.3d (December 8, 2004), in which we held that a partially-handwritten, check-marked, and fill-in-the-blank instrument denominated a "Civil Order," although different in form from an "ordinary, typewritten judgment," was nonetheless a judgment because it bore all of the significant indicia of a judgment. In Mattingly, as in this case, we were faced with deciding which of two orders constituted a final judgment for purposes of appeal. We said that the "Civil Order" was a valid judgment for purpos
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