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Jarrell v. Stant Manufacturing2/16/2005
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Dr. Reddy saw Jarrell on December 1, 2000, and he diagnosed her with sacroiliac joint dysfunction. Jarrell did not respond to the treatment of injections, and Dr. Reddy returned her to light work with no impairment rating. He commented that she might have to learn to live with her pain. He offered chronic pain management using anti-depressant medication, and Jarrell refused.
The Commission authorized a change of physician for Jarrell pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-514 (Repl. 2002). Jarrell saw Dr. Burba on January 27, 2003. He ordered x-rays and an MRI of her pelvis. Dr. Burba found that "there is a moderately severe axonal sensory and motor polyneuropathy on the lower extremities." Dr. Burba referred Jarrell to Dr. Covey for possible trigger point injections, but these injections were never carried out.
The only medical bill that Stant Manufacturing and AIG paid after the change of physician was the bill for the first office visit to Dr. Burba. Stant and AIG contended that any further medical treatment was unreasonable and unnecessary. The employer is only required to provide medical services that are reasonably necessary in treatment of the compensable injury . See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-508(a) (Repl. 2002). What constitutes reasonably necessary medical treatment is a question to be determined by the Commission. Gansky v. Hi-Tech Eng'g, 325 Ark. 163, 924 S.W.2d 790 (1996).
Before she changed physicians, Jarrell had received numerous MRIs, CT scans, bone scans, myelograms, examinations, and consultations from several doctors, and none of these doctors could pinpoint the exact cause of Jarrell's pain. Jarrell is not a candidate for surgery, and she has no work restrictions or permanent impairment. Dr. Burba conducted the same diagnostic testing that Jarrell's previous doctors had performed after her accident. Dr. Burba has never indicated that Jarrell's past medical treatment was inadequate or inappropriate. Jarrell relies on Stephenson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 70 Ark. App. 265, 19 S.W.3d 36 (2000), for her argument that further treatment is reasonable and necessary. In Tyson, the claimant sustained a neck, shoulder, and back injury , which were never properly diagnosed by her treating physician. The claimant then went to her family physician, who ordered more testing that showed a spine fracture. The Commission characterized the claimant's treatment as adequate, but this Court disagreed, stating that the claimant's care was "almost non-existent." Id. at 273, 19 S.W.3d at 41. In Jarrell's case, she cannot argue that her care was "almost non-existent" as in Tyson. Following Jarrell's injury, her employer provided her with adequate medical care that included, but was not limited to, access to diagnostic testing as well as consultations with orthopedic and neurology specialists. Neither Jarrell nor her present treating physician, Dr. Burba, has called into question the adequacy of Jarrell's past medical treatment in her case. She argues that a new treating physician should be allowed a reasonable time to perform tests and multiple examinations in order to rule out certain problems and focus on a diagnosis before the Commission can determine that such treatment is not reasonable or necessary. Jarrell, however, has not demonstrated why she believes the same diagnostic tests as performed by another doctor will bring her any closer to ascertaining the cause of her pain. Jarrell received adequate care, and reasonable minds could conclude that additional medical treatment is unnecessary and unreasonable. Substantial evidence, therefore, supports the Commission's decision.
Affirmed.
Robbins and Griffen, JJ., agree.
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