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Hutto v. Francisco3/3/2005
This appeal requires us to decide whether a vehicle owner may bear tort liability for a death arising from the absence of a safety belt. Specifically, may a jury find that the owner must maintain the safety belt as part of his duty to keep his vehicle in safe operating condition? Is state tort law liability permitted despite the existence of federal safety regulation of vehicle manufacturers?
We answer both of these questions affirmatively. Accordingly, we reverse the superior court's summary judgment for Defendant vehicle owners.
Sadly, this case involves the death of the fifteen-year-old son of Defendant Warren Francisco III and of Plaintiff Jana L. Hutto. Their son was driving a 1971 Chevrolet pickup truck owned by himself and his father. The son was involved in a single-vehicle accident in which he was ejected from the vehicle. The truck lacked any safety belts.
The 1971 model truck was manufactured with safety belts. At the time, federal law did not yet require safety belts, but the manufacturer had installed them.
Defendant and his son purchased the truck in 1999. The truck then lacked the belts, but retained the cutouts in the seat for the belts. Defendant refurbished the truck after he purchased it, but did not replace the missing belts.
Plaintiff alleged that Defendants were negligent. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants Warren Francisco III and his wife. The court apparently decided that, as a matter of law, the failure to reinstall safety belts in their vehicle was not unreasonable and could not constitute negligence. Plaintiff timely appealed. Our jurisdiction rests on Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-2101(B) (2003). In a timely cross-appeal, Defendants contend that the court erred in ruling that this action is not preempted by federal law.
We first address Defendants' argument that this action is preempted by federal law. We review federal preemption issues de novo. Hill v. Peterson, 201 Ariz. 363, 365, 5, 35 P.3d 417, 419 (App. 2001). State law is preempted by federal law in three instances: (1) express preemption, when Congress explicitly defines the extent to which an enactment preempts state law; (2) field or implied preemption, when state law regulates conduct in a field Congress intended the federal government to occupy exclusively; and (3) conflict preemption, when state law actually conflicts with federal law. Eastern Vanguard Forex, Ltd. v. Ariz. Corp. Com'n, 206 Ariz. 399, 405, 18, 79 P.3d 86, 92 (App. 2003) (citations omitted). Because Defendants do not clearly indicate how this action is preempted, we will address each. However, federal law does not preempt this tort action on any of these grounds.
Express preemption does not bar this action. Defendants rely on the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub.L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718, and the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 U.S.C. § 30101, et seq. (2004) (formerly 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq.). However, Defendants cite no preemption provision. On the contrary, Congress disavowed such a purpose: "Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law." 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (2004) (formerly 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k)). See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867-68 (2000) (Safety Act forbids state safety standards that conflict with federal standards, but quoted language preserves state law tort actions, subject only to conflict preemption principles.).
Field or implied preemption also does not preclude this action. Defendants rely on Hernandez-Gomez v. Volkswagen, 2
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