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Hutto v. Francisco3/3/2005
01 Ariz. 141, 32 P.3d 424 (App. 2001). Hernandez-Gomez held that the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards impliedly preempted a product liability action against a vehicle manufacturer. Id. at 144-45, 13, 32 P.3d at 427-28 (citing Geier, 529 U.S. at 866). Unlike Hernandez-Gomez and the other cases cited by Defendants, however, this action is not against a manufacturer, and the Act regulates only manufacturers. Instead, this case is against individuals, whose conduct is not regulated by the standards. Federal safety regulation of vehicle manufacturers does not occupy the field of tort liability among individuals who are owners or operators of vehicles or passengers in them.
Nor does preemption arise from conflict between state law and federal statutes. The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards required passenger cars manufactured after January 1, 1968 to include seatbelts, and pickup trucks manufactured after January 1, 1972 to include the same. Defendants assert that this creates a conflict. Actual conflict between federal and state law occurs, for purposes of preemption, when it is impossible to comply with both federal and state law, or "where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Hernandez-Gomez, 201 Ariz. at 142-43, 3, 32 P.3d at 425-26 (citation omitted). Defendants have not demonstrated, nor have we found, an actual conflict. The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards mandate the equipment that the manufacturers are required to install, while this action involves the duty of subsequent owners to maintain their vehicles in a safe condition. Accordingly, the court did not err in ruling that this action is not preempted by federal law.
We now turn to whether Plaintiff has a viable tort claim under state law. Plaintiff's claim should not have been rejected by summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 305, 802 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1990). In reviewing a summary judgment, we determine de novo whether questions of material fact exist and whether the court properly applied the law. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters, Inc., 199 Ariz. 261, 263, 3, 17 P.3d 106, 108 (App. 2000). We hold that Plaintiff is entitled to a jury determination of her claim that Defendants failed to maintain the vehicle in a safe condition.
Plaintiff first argues that Defendants were negligent per se because they failed to reinstall the safety belts, thus allowing the truck to be driven in an unsafe condition in violation of A.R.S. § 28-921(A)(1)(a) (2004). "Negligence per se applies when there has been a violation of a specific requirement of a law." Griffith v. Valley of the Sun Recovery and Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 126 Ariz. 227, 229, 613 P.2d 1283, 1285 (App. 1980) (citation omitted).
However, the statute involved, A.R.S. § 28-921(A)(1)(a), does not create a sufficiently specific standard by which conduct is to be measured. It provides only a general principle that vehicles must be safely maintained, and does not specifically require safety belts. The statute provides:
A. A person shall not:
1. Drive or move and the owner shall not knowingly cause or permit to be driven or moved on a highway a vehicle or combination of vehicles that:
(a) Is in an unsafe condition that endangers a person.
A.R.S. § 28-921(A)(1)(a).
Such a general standard does not support negligence per se. "The statute or regulation must 'proscribe certain or specific acts' to support a finding
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