 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Hutto v. Francisco3/3/2005
of . . . negligence per se." Jefferson L. Lankford & Douglas A. Blaze, The Law of Negligence in Arizona § 3.05 (3d ed. 2004) (quoting Griffith, 126 Ariz at 229, 613 P.2d at 1285). "Therefore, if a statute defines only a general standard of care . . . negligence per se is inappropriate." Id. Arizona courts have deemed similarly general statutes inadequate for negligence per se. See Deering v. Carter, 92 Ariz. 329, 333, 376 P.2d 857, 860 (1962) (jury instruction was erroneous that stated that the failure to drive an appropriate reduced speed when approaching or crossing an intersection or hill crest in the presence of an actual or potential hazard was negligence per se); Griffith, 126 Ariz. at 229, 613 P.2d at 1285 (violation of the statute authorizing repossession without judicial process if it can be accomplished without a breach of the peace is not negligence per se because the statute does not proscribe certain or specific acts). See also Snyder v. Keckler, 332 S.E.2d 281, 283 (W.Va. 1985) (violation of statute requiring all motor vehicles driven on highways be in good working order and safe mechanical condition is not negligence per se). Accordingly, negligence per se does not apply.
Although Defendants were not negligent per se, a jury might find negligence under the common law standard. Negligence requires proof of a duty owed to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, an injury proximately caused by that breach, and damage. Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 504, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (1983).
The superior court correctly found that Defendants had a duty not to expose users of the vehicle to an unreasonable risk. The owner of a vehicle has a duty to maintain his vehicle in a reasonably safe condition. See A.R.S. § 28-921(A)(1)(a). See also Siverson v. Martori, 119 Ariz. 440, 443, 581 P.2d 285, 288 (App. 1978) (owners of motorcycle owed duty to keep it in reasonably safe condition). The court further found that the risk was foreseeable.
The court, however, incorrectly granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment because it found the risk of harm was not unreasonable. This question should have been left for the jury to resolve.
While " ot every foreseeable risk is an unreasonable risk," deciding whether a risk was unreasonable "requires an evaluative judgment ordinarily left to the jury." Rogers v. Retrum, 170 Ariz. 399, 402-03, 825 P.2d 20, 23-24 (App. 1991). However, "courts set outer limits [and a] jury will not be permitted to require a party to take a precaution that is clearly unreasonable." Id. at 403, 825 P.2d at 23 (citation omitted).
We cannot say as a matter of law that it is unreasonable to expect an owner to maintain the original safety equipment in the vehicle installed by the manufacturer, or that the risk posed by the absence of such equipment is one that motorists or passengers should reasonably bear. "As a general rule, a motorist is simply better off wearing a seat belt." Law v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 147, 153, 755 P.2d 1135, 1141 (1988).
The importance of such devices in preventing death and avoiding injury is beyond doubt. Lack of a safety restraint markedly increases the risks of ejection from the vehicle and of death. In 2003, according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 70 percent of pickup truck drivers killed in traffic crashes were not using restraints. U.S. Department of Transportation, National Center for Statistics & Analysis, Traffic Safety Facts 2003 - Occupant Protection, DOT HS 809 765. The government further reported that use of safety belts reduces risk of fatal injury by 60 percent for light truck occupants. Id. Moreover, in 2003, 74 percent of passengers eject
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Arizona Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|