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Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts3/24/2005
Memorandum Decision
(filed June 10, 2004)
In this case, we must decide whether a plaintiff who has no individual claim against a defendant may allege class action claims against that defendant and require the defendant to remain as a party to the lawsuit because she seeks to represent a class of other purported plaintiffs, some of whom may have claims against the defendant.
I.
Eleanora Fernandez brought a class action lawsuit against, among others, Takata Seat Belts, SGS U.S. Testing Company, Inc., Nissan North America, General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and DaimlerChrysler Corporation. She alleged fraudulent concealment, violation of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, unjust enrichment, and constructive trust. Fernandez claimed that between 1986 and 1999, several automobile manufacturers installed in their vehicles TK-52 seatbelt buckles manufactured by Takata and tested by SGS U.S. Testing. She alleged that the TK-52 buckles were defective because they could disengage in accidents. She also contended that all of the defendants knew about this supposed defect and that they concealed this risk from consumers.
The complaint did not specify the make or model of the automobile Fernandez owned. But she later conceded that she did not own a Nissan, General Motors, Ford, or DaimlerChrysler vehicle. These four automobile manufacturers filed a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The superior court dismissed all of Fernandez's claims, concluding that she had failed to allege essential elements of each of her four claims.
Fernandez appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of her individual claims against the four automobile manufacturers. Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, et al., 1-CA-CV 03-0473, 11-12 (Ariz. App. June 10, 2004) (mem. decision). Under the standard of review for a motion to dismiss, however, the court stated that "until such time as the trial court issues an order determining whether a class action can be maintained in this case," it would "decline to review the viability of Plaintiff's class action claims against the automobile manufacturers in her representative capacity." Id. at 13.
The automobile manufacturers petitioned for review, contending that Fernandez's "inability to assert individual claims against the automobile manufacturers precludes her from suing" them "on behalf of a proposed class." We granted review because this is a matter of first impression for this court. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3), of the Arizona Constitution, Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-120.24 (2003), and Rule 23 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.
II.
A.
We have previously concluded that "the question of standing in Arizona is not a constitutional mandate since we have no counterpart to the 'case or controversy' requirement of the federal constitution," Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in Ariz., 148 Ariz. 1, 6, 712 P.2d 914, 919 (1985) (citing State v. B Bar Enters., 133 Ariz. 99, 649 P.2d 978 (1982)), and thus, when addressing questions of standing "we are confronted only with questions of prudential or judicial restraint." Id. Nonetheless, we have established a rigorous standing requirement. "To gain standing to bring an action, a plaintiff must allege a distinct and palpable injury." Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 69, 16, 961 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1998) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). We will consider the merits of a case without such an injury "only in exceptional ci
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