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Bullard v. California State Automobile Association5/10/2005
onditions which are performed or exist prior to the adoption of the statute.' [Citations.]" (Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 388, 391; Garner, Dict. of Modern Legal Usage (2d ed. 1995) p. 768 [the terms are used synonymously].) Retroactivity of a statute is a question of law subject to our de novo review. (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1413.) We conclude that the plain language of the statute -- which does not expressly provide for retroactive application -- demonstrates the Legislature's intent with regard to the 2003 amendment to section 11580.2, subdivision (i).
There is no dispute that the Bullards failed to file suit against Hall, reach agreement as to the amount due with CSAA or demand arbitration within one year of the June 16, 2002, accident.
"A basic canon of statutory interpretation is that statutes do not operate retrospectively unless the Legislature plainly intended them to do so. [Citations.]" (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243.) The presumption against retroactive application is grounded in principles of due process and proscriptions against ex post facto laws. (Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 841.) Thus, "a statute may be applied retroactively only if it contains express language of retroactivity or if other sources provide a clear and unavoidable implication that the Legislature intended retroactive application. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 844.) The Legislature is well acquainted with these principles and uses clear language when it intends a statute to operate retroactively. (Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 821, 828.)
The same legal principles apply to statutory amendments that enlarge limitations periods. " nless the statute expressly provides to the contrary any such enlargement applies [only] to matters pending but not already barred." (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Cranston (1962) 58 Cal.2d 462, 465; see Krupnick v. Duke Energy Morro Bay (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1029 (Krupnick).) The rear-end collision occurred on June 16, 2002. The Bullards took no action to preserve their uninsured motorist claim before the one-year limitations period expired on June 16, 2003. The Governor signed Senate Bill No. 333, amending section 11580.2, on July 14, 2003, to become effective January 1, 2004. (Stats. 2003, ch. 56, p. 1.) There is nothing in the language of section 11580.2, subdivision (i) to indicate the Legislature intended the two-year limitations period apply retroactively to include claims already time-barred.
Citing Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 686, the Bullards contend that the presumption against retroactivity is subordinate to the more fundamental rule that a statute must be interpreted to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. They argue that the amendment to section 11580.2, subdivision (i) is subject to multiple interpretations precisely because the Legislature failed to indicate it intended retroactive application.
The Bullards are correct that in the absence of an express declaration of legislative intent regarding retroactive application, courts may consider other factors including the context of the legislation, its objective, public policy and the evils to be remedied. (Santangelo v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 804, 814.) However, these factors are of no assistance here.
To demonstrate context, the Bullards cite the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 333 (the amendment to 11580.2) -- specifically, the proceedings before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 22, 2003. The staff analysis cited the sponsor's description of the n
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