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Bullard v. California State Automobile Association5/10/2005
ormer section 11580.2, subdivision (h) to provide the same one-year limitations period as Code of Civil Procedure section 340. The Bullards argue that when the Legislature amended Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 to enlarge the limitations period to two years, the Legislature was "presumed to know that statutes held to be an adjunct to the personal injury statute would be affected in order to carry out the purpose of the dependent statute." They emphasize that the purpose of the "dependent" statute -- the uninsured motorist law -- is to provide protection for injury caused by uninsured motorists. (State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Lykouresis (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 57, 61-62 (State Farm Mutual).)
There are several difficulties with the Bullards' analysis. First, both Arrasmith and State Farm Mutual predate the January 2003 effective date of the amendment adding Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 and do not address the impact of the new statute on former section 11580.2. A second, and related, problem is that the Bullards ignore the context of the 2002 legislation -- the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The uncodified portions of Senate Bill No. 688 read, in part:
"The Legislature finds and declares, as follows: [ ] . . . [ ] (b) Under current law, victims of personal injury and wrongful death are now required to file lawsuits within a year in order to meet unduly short statutes of limitations. Many such matters would be resolved without the need to resort to litigation if California's statute of limitations permitted such actions to be filed within two years, as the vast majority of other states provide for a longer time to resolve claims short of litigation.
"(c) A prime example of the inequity caused by the one-year statute of limitations is that residents of California who were victims of the terrorist actions of September 11, 2001, must prematurely choose between litigation and federal remedies . . . . Extending the statute of limitations will reduce litigation in these cases as well . . . ." (Stats. 2002, ch. 448, § 1, subds. (b) & (c), pp. 1-2.)
In Code of Civil Procedure 340.10, the Legislature expressly provided for retroactive application of the two-year limitations period to one class of plaintiffs -- the victims of the "9/11" terrorist attacks. (Stats. 2002, ch. 448, § 1, subd. (d), § 4, pp. 3-4; Krupnick, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029.) There is no indication that it intended to enlarge the class entitled to the special, retroactive protection provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.10. The Legislature's findings demonstrate that Senate Bill No. 688 had nothing to do with uninsured motorist coverage.
Third, the Bullards invite this court to legislate a statutory amendment by implication in violation of the separation of powers. Courts routinely construe statutes enacted by the Legislature in their role as interpreters of the law. (Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1213; see, e.g., Krupnick, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1028-1029.) In this case, we already concluded the Legislature did not intend that the amendment to section 11580.2, subdivision (i) establishing a two-year limitations period apply retroactively from its January 2004 effective date. We may not usurp the function of the Legislature by adopting an amendment to the same statute by implication where no amendment was intended.
III. CSAA Is Not Estopped To Deny The Demand For Arbitration
The Bullards concede that CSAA was "not under a duty to inform [them] of any statute of limitations issues, given that [they] were represented by counsel." (See § 11580.2, subd. (k); see also Juarez v. 21st Century
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