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Johnson v. Cahill Contractors4/25/2005
rather than on a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence. A majority of chances never can suffice alone to establish a proposition of fact, since the slightest real evidence would outweigh all contrary probabilities.' [Citation.]" ' " ' " (California Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1, 45, quoting Brautigam v. Brooks (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 547, 556-557.)
An inference that a condition existed at one point in time may in some circumstances support a reasonable inference that the same condition existed at a later time. For example, the fact that a defendant was observed driving at an excessive speed just before an accident may reasonably support an inference that he was speeding when the accident occurred. (Jennings v. Arata (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 143, 146.) However, an inference based on Gilson's testimony that Cahill was the general contractor for the Tishman Building construction project in 1973 to 1974 depends on making more substantial assumptions than those in the automobile example. First, we are concerned with the potential for a change in condition taking place over the course of one or two years, not one or two minutes. Second, as noted, Gilson could not recall who the general contractor was when he returned to the Tishman project. Since Gilson conveyed no hesitation in naming Cahill as the general contractor during his first stint, his inability to identify Cahill as the general contractor for the later period calls into doubt the assumption Johnson proposes, that the general contractor did not change in the interim. Third, Gilson referred to some type of serious incident or problem in the construction. This further militates against assuming that the company supervising construction remained the same. Fourth, Johnson failed to provide evidence that it would have been exceptional or unusual for the owner or developer of a project of this nature to change its general contractor before construction was complete. Such evidence, at a minimum, was necessary to close the logical gap left by Gilson's testimony. In our view, the Gilson testimony, standing alone, fails to support an inference that Cahill was the general contractor when Johnson worked on the Tishman Building project.
Based on our de novo review of the record, Johnson failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to Cahill's responsibility for his injuries. Summary judgment was therefore proper.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment in favor of Cahill is affirmed.
We concur: Marchiano, P.J., Swager, J.
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