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Basco v. Tishgart6/14/2005
t California Farmers Market was an ongoing business and that both named defendants were insured with policy limits far in excess of Basco's judgment. There was more than adequate evidence to support the trial court's [implied] finding that the underlying defendants were `solvent' and that a judgment against those defendants would have been collectible."
A malpractice plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant-attorney could have established liability and would have been able to collect something of the judgment; total collectibility is not required. (See Garretson v. Harold I. Miller (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 563, 568-572 and decisions cited.) As we have already seen in part IV, ante, the record citations bear out respondent's argument that the Farmers' Market and Barbara Casarez had $300,000 of insurance. In light of the fact that the attorney malpractice judgment here was for $30,510, it is reasonable to assume that a favorable judgment in the underlying judgment would not have been greater. It is a reasonable inference that the insurer could easily have paid such a sum to respondent. (See id. at pp. 573-574.) We therefore find abundant evidence to support the trial court's implied finding to that effect.
VI.
Appellant's final contention is "the trial court incorrectly considered [summaries of] medical bills of respondent in the absence of such bills or competent testimony" as to the amount of respondent's medical expenses. Again, respondent cogently explains why appellant does not establish reversible error: "The court provisionally accepted a billing statement as plaintiff's Exhibit 1, but held specifically that it would not be considered `for the truth' of the amount of the bills, ruling that ` omebody has to be able to testify that these were reasonably incurred bills, et cetera.' [ ] Somebody did testify as to the reasonable value of accident-related medical care provided to Basco after her accident. Tracy Newkirk, M.D., testified that the reasonable value of that care was $6,500. This was precisely the amount of past medical treatment [damages] awarded by the trial judge. [ ] The trial judge did not allow the billing statement into evidence for the truth of its contents, so there was no error. In any event, the reasonable value of Basco's medical care was proven by the testimony of a qualified medical witness, which renders harmless any possible error in admitting or considering the billing statement."
We mention only one additional point. When a trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, admits evidence for a limited purpose, or states that it will consider evidence only for a limited purpose, the court is presumed to have done so, unless the record shows otherwise. (E.g., People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644; White v. White (1890) 82 Cal. 427, 452; Jones v. Morse (1868) 36 Cal. 205, 207; Cano v. Tyrrell (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 824, 834.) Here, the record does not show otherwise.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Reardon, J., Rivera, J.
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