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Minto v. Sprague6/16/2005
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Marquez and Loeb, JJ., concur
In this negligence action, plaintiffs, Keith D. Minto and Georgina L. Minto, appeal from the judgment entered upon a jury verdict in favor of defendant, Neil Sprague. We affirm.
Plaintiffs allege that their land was damaged by a fire that started on defendant's adjoining parcel. Defendant testified that while he was operating a bulldozer on his land, the machine scraped a rock and caused a fire. The fire quickly spread, burning an area of approximately 1,200 to 1,500 acres, including plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs sued defendant for negligence.
Plaintiffs tendered jury instructions, including one regarding strict liability patterned on § 13-21-105, C.R.S. 2004, and one regarding res ipsa loquitur. The trial court rejected both instructions. Plaintiffs appeal based on these rulings.
I. Strict Liability
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred when it declined to instruct the jury on the doctrine of strict liability under § 13-21-105. We are not persuaded.
Section 13-21-105(1) states: " f any person sets fire to any woods or prairie so as to damage any other person, such person shall make satisfaction for the damage to the party injured, to be recovered in an action before any court of competent jurisdiction."
A. Standard of Review
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review. Hendricks v. People, 10 P.3d 1231 (Colo. 2000).
We interpret statutes in a manner that gives effect to the General Assembly's intent. To do this, we begin with the language of the statute, giving words their plain and ordinary meaning. Carlson v. Ferris, 85 P.3d 504 (Colo. 2003).
When the plain language of a statute is free from ambiguity, other rules of statutory construction are unnecessary. Kinder v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 976 P.2d 295 (Colo. App. 1998); Spanish Peaks Mental Health Ctr. v. Huffaker, 928 P.2d 741 (Colo. App. 1996). The court should only resort to extraneous evidence for clarification when an uncertainty exists. McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 120 Colo. 380, 209 P.2d 910 (1949).
B. "Sets Fire To"
Plaintiffs contend that, as used in § 13-21-105(1), "sets fire to" are words of strict liability. We conclude that "sets fire to" may be words of strict liability, but they refer to setting fire as an act whose purpose is to start a fire, not to an act whose purpose is otherwise.
1. Common Usage
Article 21 of Title 13 contains no definition of "sets fire to." In its most common usage, the word "sets" connotes a purposeful effort to bring about a desired condition. See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2077 (1986). And § 13-21-105 contains no language indicating that the General Assembly intended to impose liability on those who do not seek to start a fire. For example, it does not contain phrases such as "causes a fire," "intentionally or otherwise," or "negligently or otherwise." Cf., e.g., §§ 18-13-109, 40-30-103, C.R.S. 2004.
2. Ultrahazardous Activities and Defendant's Activity
Strict liability is most commonly applied in matters of product liability, ultrahazardous activities, and trespass that, by their nature, may cause harm to others regardless of the exercise of due care. Because the statute here bears no relationship to product liability and there is no allegation that the fire began when defendant was trespassing on plaintiffs' land, we consider plaintiffs' proposed interpretation in the context of the law of ultrahazardous activities.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1
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