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Minto v. Sprague6/16/2005
entional conduct.
If a statute is ambiguous, we may consider other matters, including the legislative history of the statute. Section 2-4-203, C.R.S. 2004. However, " courts avoid deducing the intent behind one act of [the legislature] from the implication of a second act passed years later." Schrader v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 768 F.2d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 1985).
Moreover, the "interpretation placed upon an existing statute by a subsequent group of [legislators] who are promoting legislation and who are unsuccessful has no persuasive significance." United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411, 82 S.Ct. 1354, 1358-59, 8 L.Ed.2d 590 (1962).
Assuming, without deciding, that the phrase "sets fire to" in subsection (1) is ambiguous, we conclude that it is inappropriate to consider floor debate on a bill that died decades after adoption of the language at issue. See Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lederer, 252 U.S. 523, 40 S.Ct. 397, 64 L.Ed. 698 (1920).
4. Railroad Statute
Plaintiffs also contend that there is a latent ambiguity in the words "sets fire to" and argue that § 13-21-105 imposes strict liability because it is indistinguishable from § 40-30-103, a strict liability railroad statute. Again, we disagree.
Section 40-30-103 states that " very railroad company operating its [railroad] . . . shall be liable for all damages by fires that are set out or caused by operating any such [railroad] . . . whether negligently or otherwise."
Plaintiffs' assertion that the foregoing language is indistinguishable from § 13-21-105(1) is erroneous. The strict liability established in the railroad statute arises most clearly from the phrases "whether negligently or otherwise," and "or caused by operating" a railroad, not from the phrase "fires that are set out." In addition, the railroad statute pertains only to the operation of a railroad and reflects legislative policy regarding the inherent dangers of railroads.
5. Kansas Law
In oral argument, plaintiffs asserted that, because decisions of Kansas courts interpret a statute that includes the phrase "shall set fire to" as imposing strict liability, we must conclude that the meaning of "sets fire to" is ambiguous and, as a result, consider the Kansas decisions to determine the intent of our own General Assembly. We reject this assertion.
Kansas General Statute 1901, § 8010 (repealed 1972) stated: " f any person shall set on fire any woods, marshes, or prairies . . . he shall be liable to the party injured for the full amount of such damage, to be recovered by civil action."
The Kansas court has held that this statute creates strict liability, but only for one who intentionally sets a fire to woods, marshes, or prairies. More precisely, the court has stated, "Of course, this 'setting on fire' must be the direct intentional act of the defendant . . . and not an unavoidable accident." Hunt v. Haines, 25 Kan. 210, 210 (1881)(citing Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Davidson, 14 Kan. 349 (1875)). The court confirmed this interpretation in Johnston v. Marriage, 74 Kan. 208 (1906), where it said, "To recover under this statute, it is necessary to show a direct and intentional setting of fire to woods, marsh, or prairie."
D. Conclusion
We conclude that neither the decisions of the Kansas courts, nor § 40-30-103, nor § 13-21-105(2)(a) reveals ambiguity in the meaning of "sets fire to." We further conclude that interpreting "sets fire to" as imposing liability for accidental fires would be contrary to the general principles of common law strict liability. Consequently, we perceive no reasonable basis to conclude tha
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