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CLPF-Parkridge One1/31/2005
damage to the party's interest. Benton v. Adams, 56 P.3d 81, 85 (Colo. 2002)(holding that an "original proceeding is not a substitute for an appeal, but we may act to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 when an adverse procedural ruling significantly impairs a party's ability to litigate the controversy"). We may also choose to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction under the rule to consider an issue of significant public importance we have not yet decided. Burchett v. South Denver Windustrial Co., 42 P.3d 19, 20 (Colo. 2002).
The proper construction of section 13-80-104(1)(b)(II) is a matter of first impression of widespread importance to citizens of Colorado and the construction industry.
II.
We hold that section 13-80-104(1)(b)(II), C.R.S. (2004) does not bar cross-claims and third-party claims for indemnity or contribution in construction defect lawsuits; rather, this section also allows indemnity or contribution claims to be brought by a separate lawsuit but no later than ninety days after termination of the construction defect lawsuit.
A. Standard of Review
The proper construction of section 13-80-104(1)(b)(II)is a question of law we review de novo. In construing a statute, our duty is to effectuate the intent and purpose of the General Assembly. Weld County Sch. Dist. RE-12 v. Bymer, 955 P.2d 550, 554 (Colo. 1998). We read the statute as a whole, giving sensible effect to all of its parts whenever possible. Mortgage Invs. v. Battle Mountain, 70 P.3d 1176, 1183 (Colo. 2003).
If the statutory provisions are clear, we apply their plain and ordinary meaning. Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 327 (Colo. 2004). If statutory provisions are in conflict, we adopt the interpretation that best harmonizes the various provisions if possible. Lobato v. Indust. Claim Appeals Office, No. 03SC556, slip op. at 10 (Colo. Jan. 18, 2005).
If the statutory provisions are unclear, ambiguous, or susceptible to different interpretations, we look to sources of legislative intent, including the object the legislature sought to obtain by the enactment, the circumstances under which it was adopted, and the consequences of a particular construction.
ยง 2-4-203(1), C.R.S. (2004); See Anderson v. Longmont Toyota, 102 P.3d 323, 327 (Colo. 2004). We may consider the statute's declaration of purpose, its title, and its legislative history in construing legislative intent. Mortgage Invs. Corp. v. Battle Mountain Corp., 70 P.3d at 1183; Mountain City Meat Co. v. Oqueda, 919 P.2d 246, 252 (Colo. 1996).
We do not adopt a construction that produces an illogical or absurd result. Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807, 811 (Colo. 2004); Concerned Parents of Pueblo, Inc. v. Gilmore, 47 P.3d 311, 313 (Colo. 2002).
B. Section 13-80-104(1)(b)(II) is a Tolling Provision, Not a Ripeness Provision
Although the General Assembly placed section 13-80-104(1)(b)(II) in a statute of limitations section applicable to "actions against architects, contractors, builders or builder vendors, engineers, inspectors, and others," the trial court interpreted it to be a ripeness bar against cross-claims and third-party indemnity or contribution claims until after the construction defect lawsuit has terminated in settlement or judgment against the person seeking indemnity or contribution.
The effect of the trial court's ruling is to nullify the operation of C.R.C.P. 13 and 14 in construction defect law suits. These rules provide a mechanism for disposing of multiple claims arising from a single set of facts in one action, where a third party may be liable to the defendant for all or part of the plai
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