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District of Columbia v. Beretta4/21/2005
e holding of the Gore case does not apply.").
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
WAGNER, Chief Judge, concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part:
In my view, the trial court properly dismissed the individual plaintiffs' claims under the Strict Liability Act, D.C. Code § 7-2551.02 (the Act) set forth in their Third Amended Complaint. Under this Act, a manufacturer, importer or dealer of an assault weapon is subject to liability without fault only if a plaintiff's injuries proximately resulted from the discharge of one of the weapons of that particular manufacturer, importer or dealer. D.C. Code § 7-2551.02. In this case, as the trial court concluded, plaintiffs did not allege that any one of the twenty-five (25) named defendants and one to one-hundred (1 to 100) DOE defendants is a manufacturer, importer or dealer of the weapon that actually caused them harm. Even at the en banc argument, counsel for plaintiffs/appellants had to concede that they still cannot tie any of the individual defendants to a weapon that caused harm to any one of them. Thus, plaintiffs did not and cannot plead the predicate facts to hold any of the named defendants liable for their injuries under the Act. The failure to allege an essential element of the cause of action created by the Act is fatal to plaintiffs' pleading, and defendants are entitled to dismissal under our rules and precedents. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12 (b)(6) (failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted); see also Bible Way Church v. Beards, 680 A.2d 419, 432 (D.C. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155 (1997) (affirming dismissal of breach of contract and tortious interference with contract claims under Rule 12 (b)(6) because the complaint did not indicate that plaintiff had a contract with defendant).
To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must "'outline or adumbrate' a violation of the statute or constitutional provisions upon which the plaintiff relies, Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Co., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984), and connect the violation to the named defendants; Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 1987)." Brownlee v. Conine, 957 F.2d 353, 354 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). Here, the complaint fails to connect plaintiffs' injuries to any of the named defendants.
Even under the liberal "notice pleading" standard embodied in Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8 (a)(2) and its federal counterpart, "it is still necessary that a complaint 'contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.'" Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation, 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 8, 1981)). Identifying the party liable for a particular wrong is one of the most fundamental requirements for an adequately pleaded claim. See Elmore v. Stevens, 824 A.2d 44 (D.C. 2003). In Elmore, this court rejected as inadequate a complaint that never alleged that the defendant did anything connected with plaintiff's claims. Id. at 46; see also McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) ("[The court's] duty to be 'less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations."(quoting Hurney v. Carver, 602 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1979)). Here, plaintiffs' failure to identify in the complaint the manufacturer of the firearm which caused them harm negates any claim under the Strict Liabili
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