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Weakley v. Burnham Corp.4/14/2005
er that may be, we think that in the present case a reasonable solution, not unduly objectionable to any party, may be at hand. In their briefs, all three parties involved in this issue have cited without disapproval Judge Joyce Hens Green's decision in Covington, from which we have quoted at the outset of this opinion. Weakley asserts that he has provided the defendants with the information that Covington would require. Moreover, Foster Wheeler has advised us in its brief on appeal that Weakley offered to question the Foster Wheeler designee only [regarding] the location of each boiler it manufactured, sold or distributed and which were installed in the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia from 1964-1974 (i.e., topics 1-3 of his Notice of Deposition). JA at 160-61. Weakley proffered that he would seek to depose the witness on topics 4-16 of his Notice f Deposition only if the first phase of inquiry revealed specific sites where a Foster Wheeler boiler was used where Weakley worked. JA at 161.
In light of the foregoing, we are satisfied that the dispute over the protective orders can be readily resolved in a manner that will minimize the burden upon the defendants while still providing Weakley with relevant information. We therefore direct the trial court to apply to this record the ruling in Covington and to limit Weakley's inquiry along the lines described in the passage we have quoted from in Foster Wheeler's brief.
IV. CONCLUSION
Product liability cases involving asbestos are very difficult, for plaintiffs generally learn of their illness so long after their exposure to asbestos that it is often all but impossible for them to be able to detail exactly where and when the events that caused their affliction occurred and by whom the exposure was caused. This reality has had consequences for asbestos litigation, but it does not justify placing an unrealistic initial burden on plaintiffs who have contracted asbestosis or other diseases as a result of contact with asbestos-containing products.
A plaintiff who provides information under oath that he has had contact sufficient to do him harm with a defendant's product should not be expected to provide detailed information (which it is likely to be impossible for him to recall) either in order to be permitted reasonable discovery or to avoid the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In this case, we are of the opinion that the Superior Court set the bar too high for the plaintiff, both by issuing the protective orders and by granting summary judgment. Accordingly, the orders awarding summary judgment to the defendants are reversed. The protective orders are vacated. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
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