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In re Reynolds2/10/2005
8) (per curiam) (appended Board Report); In re Fogel, 679 A.2d 1052, 1055 (D.C. 1996). The Hearing Committee concluded that Petitioner had not met his burden of proof on this factor. Specifically, the Committee concluded, and we agree, that there "is no evidence that Petitioner has acknowledged the seriousness of the long pattern of unlawful conduct in which he has been engaged." HC Rpt. at 5.
Although Petitioner claims that he acknowledged "the seriousness of his offenses in the eyes of the law," which seriousness "manifested itself in substantial time of incarceration," Petitioner's Post-Hearing Reply Brief at 2, this is merely a statement that the crimes for which he was convicted are serious crimes. It is not his own recognition of the seriousness of his actions. Indeed, Petitioner attempted to diminish the seriousness of his conduct, referring to his crimes in his post-hearing brief to the Hearing Committee as mere "traffic violations." Petitioner's Post-Hearing Brief at 1.
Further, Petitioner fails to see the import of his alcohol abuse (which caused his criminal conduct) in relation to his fitness to practice law. When suspending Petitioner in 2000, the Court stated, " hile as Respondent points out, Respondent's abuse of alcohol has not yet prompted a client to complain to Bar Counsel, it would be inappropriate to ignore the pattern of Respondent's inability to comply with his responsibilities under the law and the implications of that persistent failure for his fitness as an attorney." In re Reynolds, 763 A.2d at 714. Nonetheless, in these proceedings Petitioner once again highlighted the fact that no disciplinary complaints were raised against him by clients and provided no credible evidence to indicate that he has taken the necessary steps to address his alcohol abuse. Even his own statements regarding his alcohol use are conflicting. Compare Reinstatement Questionnaire at 2 (as of January 2001 Petitioner had not consumed alcohol in three years) with Tr. II at 132 (" o me that is not the issue here. If I took a drink somewhere in the last year and a half or two years or whatever, I did not believe that that was the issue here on my fitness to practice law now."). Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving that he recognizes the seriousness of his conduct, and the fact that it was caused by his alcohol abuse.
3. Post-Discipline Conduct
The Hearing Committee that initially recommended Respondent's suspension issued its report on January 19, 2000. Between that time and December 2000, when the Court issued its final opinion in the matter, Petitioner tested positive for alcohol use, in violation of the rehabilitation programs with which he was then involved, on three occasions. See Findings of Fact 8, 10, 11. Although there is no direct evidence of alcohol use or criminal conduct after that time, Bar Counsel is not required to prove improper post-suspension conduct. Rather, the burden rests on Petitioner to prove good conduct, specifically, improvement in the conduct that lead to his discipline. See Patkus, 841 A.2d at 1269 (petitioner who had been disbarred for misappropriation had obligation to prove improvement in his precarious personal financial situation that led to misappropriation). Petitioner has failed to meet this burden.
In his Post-Hearing Reply Brief, Petitioner stated that he "continues to seek" treatment for his alcohol abuse. Post-Hearing Reply Brief at 2. The Hearing Committee concluded that this "would appear to be an acknowledgment that Petitioner has not yet changed his pattern of alcohol consumption. Certainly there is no clear and convincing evidence that he has." HC Rpt. at 7. Petitioner provided no documentary proof of
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