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White v. Sargent6/2/2005
ned the power to amend the trust and change the trustees.
Mr. Sargent died on January 30, 2001. At the time of his death, he and Mrs. Sargent were still legally married, since the divorce proceeding was still pending. Mrs. Sargent filed this suit for declaratory and equitable relief in November 2001, alleging that the trust agreement "constituted an improper attempt to evade and circumvent marital rights and should be rescinded and/or reformed." She stated in her complaint that, " nless set aside, the effect of the purported transfer is to deprive of her statutorily protected interest in the decedent's property and leave without any means of support." The trustees filed a counter-complaint for declaratory relief on the ground that "the assets of the Martha Baker Family Trust are not part of the estate of Ernest E. Sargent" because they were Mr. Sargent's "sole and separate property." Thus, they claimed, Mrs. Sargent had "no rights or interests in the assets."
After the close of discovery, Mrs. Sargent filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the trust was invalid. The trustees opposed the motion; in addition, Ms. White filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In a fifteen-page order filed on August 7, 2003, the trial court granted Mrs. Sargent's motion for summary judgment. It declared the trust null and void because it had been established to conceal Mr. Sargent's assets and to circumvent Mrs. Sargent's marital rights. The court therefore ruled that "the trust monies become part of Mr. Sargent's estate and Mrs. Sargent can claim her elective share . . . ." These appeals followed.
II.
Appellant White's primary claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Sargent. She also contends that the court abused its discretion in assigning the trust assets to Mr. Sargent's estate after it declared the trust void.
Appellant Parchment makes essentially the same arguments. Ms. Parchment, however, failed to note an appeal from the order of August 7, 2003, granting summary judgment. Instead, after Ms. White noted her appeal, Ms. Parchment filed a motion in the trial court for reconsideration of its order, citing only "Super. Ct. Civ. Rule 59 and 60." This motion was denied on November 26, 2003, but Ms. Parchment did not note an appeal from that denial. Later, on April 2, 2004, Ms. Parchment requested re-entry of the order denying reconsideration, alleging that she had never been served with a copy of the November order. The trial court, in an order entered on April 7, 2004, concluded that the November 26 order "was never docketed," and thus, "for the purpose of clarification," it denied (once again) Ms. Parchment's original motion for reconsideration. Ms. Parchment filed a timely notice of appeal from that denial.
Under this court's rules, the timely filing of a Rule 59 (e) motion (and Ms. Parchment's motion appears to have been timely) tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal from the original judgment, so that the time for noting such an appeal begins to run again from the entry of the order disposing of the Rule 59 (e) motion. See D.C. Ct. App. Rule 4 (a)(iii). This means that Ms. Parchment's appeal encompasses not only the denial of the Rule 59 (e) motion but the original judgment as well, and that her arguments on the merits are properly before us.
We turn, accordingly, to the merits.
III.
Summary judgment is proper when the court, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, concludes from the record - including "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits"
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