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American Service Center Associates v. Helton2/3/2005
luded that ASCA was "require . . . to elect between either (a) the difference in value before and after the accident or (b) the amount of the repairs, but not both." These remedies, said the judge, are "two alternate standards -- which, significantly, are set forth as non-cumulative options . . . ." Given that the insurer had paid the repair cost, ASCA was thus entitled to no further relief. The magistrate judge took great pains, however, to explain "the compelling [contrary] rationales of literally all surrounding jurisdictions which allow for [residual] diminution in value for damaged vehicles" in conjunction with the reasonable repair cost, and urged ASCA to seek appellate review.
The dealership heeded the advice and pressed its claim on intermediate review by an associate judge of the Superior Court. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 73 (b) ("Judicial review of a final order or judgment entered upon direction of a hearing commissioner [now magistrate judge] is available (1) on motion of a party to the Superior Court judge designated by the Chief Judge to conduct such reviews or (2) on the initiative of the judge so designated."). The judge affirmed the order granting summary judgment because " n the District of Columbia, there are two, alternative standards under which a Plaintiff can recover for damages to a chattel," and ASCA had been compensated under one to the exclusion of the other.
We granted ASCA's application for allowance of an appeal in order to review the judgment and to consider specifically whether a complainant may recover residual diminution in worth resulting from injury to personal property after already having been compensated for the reasonable cost of repair. See D.C. Code ยง 11-721 (c) (2001) (providing that appeals to this court from the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch may be taken by application).
II.
Until now, we have not been presented with the argument that, despite "full repair," there should be further compensation when repair alone does not restore injured property (here, an automobile) to its pre-injury value. The argument is based on a distinction, recognized by the magistrate judge, between compensation for repair costs in order to restore the car's physical appearance and function and damages to compensate for loss of market value even after such repairs have been made. A chronological survey of our cases reveals that past plaintiffs have almost always sought at trial the reasonable cost of repair, and that, in each instance, the issue on appeal was the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the amount of damages for repair. See Wright, 35 A.2d at 185 (holding that the trial court erred in directing the verdict against the plaintiff because a "receipted itemized bill," supported by testimony showing that the repairs were necessitated by the collision, is sufficient prima facie evidence of the amount of damages); Hemminger v. Scott, 111 A.2d 619, 620 (D.C. 1955) (affirming an award of the reasonable cost of repair because, despite the defendant's contrary assertion, there is no practical evidentiary distinction between the bill in Wright and the instant plaintiff's prospective repair estimate); Knox, 116 A.2d at 408 (reversing an award of the estimated cost of repair because the plaintiff did not prove that it was "reasonable," i.e., that the award "would not exceed the difference in value of his vehicle before and after the collision"); Brooks v. Capital Fleets, Inc., 123 A.2d 916, 917 (D.C. 1956) (affirming an award of repair cost because the record did not support the defendants' argument that the receipted bill and estimate work sheet establishing the plaintiff's damages were somehow suspicious or untrustworthy); Solomon v. Easterly, 16
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