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American Service Center Associates v. Helton2/3/2005
by damages for the cost of repair.
The ultimate test of the fitness of a damage award is its capacity to advance the goal of tort damages, which is "to make the injured party whole again." Bell v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 507 A.2d 548, 555 (D.C. 1986) (citation omitted); see also Blake Constr. Co. v. C. J. Coakley Co., 431 A.2d 569, 579 (D.C. 1981). Clearly, no single fixed rule for recovery of damages for injury to personal property will invariably make an injured party whole; rather, the measure of damages depends upon the facts of the particular case. See, e.g., Barker, 107 A.2d at 780 (mandating the calculation of damages according to the diminution in value of an injured automobile that had been traded in for a new car prior to trial); Royer v. Deihl, 55 A.2d 722, 724 (D.C. 1947) (calculating the damage sustained when an automobile was "totally wrecked" by subtracting the vehicle's salvage value from its reasonable market value immediately before the collision); Union Storage & Transfer Co. v. Lamphere, 40 A.2d 258, 259 (D.C. 1944) (analyzing the reasonable cost of repair to an antique table whose shattered marble top was replaced before trial); Wright, 35 A.2d at 185 (analyzing the reasonable cost of repair for an injured automobile). Though measures may vary to fit the circumstances of each case, "the position to which the injured party should be restored is the same, i.e., complete compensation for the injury." Fred Frederick Motors, Inc. v. Krause, 277 A.2d 464, 466 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971). For certain property, repair will achieve this goal and damages to compensate for the cost of repair will suffice. But for some property, the additional recovery for residual diminution in worth is necessary to make the injured party whole.
If the [chattel] is completely destroyed, the plaintiff receives the market value. To be consistent, the plaintiff should be put in the same position when his injured vehicle is repairable; he should have a vehicle of the same market value. If the repaired vehicle does not have the same market value, the plaintiff should receive additional damages. To do otherwise would put the plaintiff in a different position depending on whether the vehicle was partially or completely destroyed.
Id. We therefore hold that when a plaintiff can prove that the value of an injured chattel after repair is less than the chattel's worth before the injury, recovery may be had for both the reasonable cost of repair and the residual diminution in value after repair, provided that the award does not exceed the gross diminution in value. Our conclusion is overwhelmingly supported by decisions in other jurisdictions that have considered the issue -- including neighboring Maryland and Virginia -- which allow recovery for the cost of repair made plus the residual diminution in value. A long pedigree of influential commentary also supports this position.
III.
Summary judgment may be entered in those cases where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56 (a). Helton exclusively argued in the trial court that ASCA's requested relief was categorically unavailable in this jurisdiction, and this was the basis for the grant of summary judgment. Having determined that our law does not provide such a remedy, the trial court's stated basis for summary judgment is legally incorrect. Though Helton faults ASCA for the first time on appeal with failing to create through the affidavit a genuine issue of material fact in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the record indicates that, stripped of the erroneous legal argument we have just rejected in the preceding di
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