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Saudi Basic Industries Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co.1/14/2005 red new testimony, on two grounds. First, that testimony would reverse all of SABIC's prior positions on this issue; and second, the reversal of position would be highly prejudicial. The proffered testimony was never disclosed to ExxonMobil until SABIC filed its reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment-long after the discovery cut-off date and at a time that ExxonMobil was effectively foreclosed from countering the new testimony. The persons to whom Mr. Bin Salamah had supposedly revealed this information were not available either to be re-deposed or to be called as rebuttal witnesses at trial. By that point in time, one of those witnesses had died and the other (who was never questioned about this subject at his deposition) was unavailable to testify at trial. Not surprisingly, the trial judge ruled that:
t was SABIC's conduct during discovery that resulted in exclusion of this testimony. Simply stated, had SABIC complied in good faith with the letter and spirit of our discovery rules before trial, the Court would probably not have been forced to exclude this portion of Mr. Bin Salamah's testimony.
The trial court reasoned that Mr. Bin Salamah's new testimony was reasonably available to SABIC at all times during the discovery period; that Rule 30(b)(6) required SABIC's counsel to review that testimony with Mr. Bin Salamah before submitting the (contrary) Rule 30(b)(6) deposition testimony of Dr. Pai (as the spokesperson for the SABIC organization); and that the consequences of counsel's failure to do that should fall upon SABIC, not ExxonMobil. On the basis of "fundamental fairness," the trial court concluded that to have "allowed Mr. Bin Salamah to testify on this subject.would have rewarded SABIC for discovery techniques that do not pass muster in this Court and would have resulted in a thorough sandbagging of ExxonMobil."
We agree. Given these facts, the trial court's evidentiary ruling could not possibly constitute an abuse of discretion. Mindful of that, SABIC attacks the ruling's factual and legal predicates. SABIC argues (contrary to the trial judge's finding) that Mr. Bin Salamah's new testimony would not have contradicted that of Dr. Pai, and that SABIC's counsel was not procedurally obligated to consult with Bin Salamah before Dr. Pai's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. That argument amounts to little more than assertion without support in the record. Nowhere does SABIC come to grips with the case law that supports the trial judge's analysis and result. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's ruling is solidly grounded in both law and fact, and that SABIC's contrary arguments lack merit.
(b) The second contested evidentiary ruling was the admission into evidence of an internal memorandum by Exxon employee, John Webb, reflecting representations made by Mr. Bin Salamah in 1986, that the royalty rate called for by the SABIC/UCC license agreement for the Unipol(r) PE technology was identical to the royalty rate required by the SABIC-Kemya license agreement. SABIC claims that the Webb memorandum was admitted erroneously, because it was hearsay. The trial court, however, admitted the document as past recollection recorded, which is a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.
We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of that document. Nor was SABIC prejudiced by its admission into evidence. The trial court gave SABIC the opportunity to cross-examine Webb about the memorandum and also to call Mr. Bin Salamah and elicit his denial that he made any statement to Webb. SABIC availed itself of both opportunities.
(c) The third contested evidentiary ruling is the admission of the testimon
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