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Saudi Basic Industries Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co.1/14/2005 y of two ExxonMobil employees, George Fitzpatrick and Robert Murphy, to the effect that SABIC had promised ExxonMobil a "pass through" license, and had represented (to Messrs. Fitzpatrick and Murphy) that SABIC had "passed through" its billings to Kemya and Yanpet at SABIC's cost. SABIC claims that this testimony was "multiple hearsay." That contention is misguided. A statement is not hearsay if offered only to prove that the statement was made, rather than for the truth of the matter asserted. Here, Fitzpatrick's testimony about SABIC's statements was offered to rebut SABIC's defense that Exxon had waived its breach of contract claim, by showing that Exxon did not know about the overcharge and therefore could not have intentionally relinquished a known right. Nor could the out-of-court statement attributed to SABIC (that there was no overcharge) have been offered for its truth, because the truth was the precise opposite.
Mr. Murphy's disputed testimony was also to the effect that SABIC had promised a "pass through" license and that it had passed through its billings to Kemya and Yanpet at SABIC's cost. Murphy's testimony also was not hearsay because it was not offered for its truth. The statement was offered to correct a misimpression, created during Murphy's cross-examination, that Murphy had been told that SABIC intended to make a profit from furnishing the Unipol(r) PE technology, yet despite being so informed, ExxonMobil made no effort to follow up on that disclosure. Nor was the Murphy testimony prejudicial, because Murphy had previously testified that he received assurances from SABIC that the UCC royalties would be passed through directly to Yanpet.
(d) The fourth contested evidentiary ruling concerns the limitation by the trial court of the scope of SABIC's proffered evidence of Exxon's subjective intent in connection with ExxonMobil's possibly providing polyethene technology to the joint ventures. SABIC attempted to prove Exxon's intent by offering into evidence drafts of never-executed agreements that predated the joint venture agreements. The trial judge excluded only the evidence and testimony that pertained to Exxon's internal state of mind, as distinguished from specific objective communications to and by SABIC on this subject (which were admitted). The trial court reasoned that Exxon's intent regarding never-executed agreements that predated the joint venture were not probative of Exxon's state of mind as of the later time when the parties did execute the joint venture agreements. This ruling was a rational exercise in determining the bounds of relevancy. Even more important, the ruling did not prejudice SABIC, which was permitted to introduce evidence of the earlier negotiations as of the time that (it appeared) Exxon and Mobil might provide the polyethylene technology to the joint ventures. Moreover, in closing argument SABIC's counsel was permitted to (and did) argue that SABIC believed that a royalty mark-up was acceptable, based upon the parties' early negotiations relating to the possible provision of the technology by Exxon and Mobil. The jury chose not to credit that argument, however.
For these reasons, none of the contested evidentiary rulings constituted an abuse of discretion.
(3) THE RULINGS ON SABIC'S RELEASE DEFENSE
SABIC's third claim of error is that the trial court improperly struck SABIC's release defense. SABIC argues that the 1987 Letter Agreements, wherein ExxonMobil and SABIC renegotiated the joint ventures' license fees, operated to release all of ExxonMobil's payment-related claims against SABIC. Because the court dismissed that defense as a matter of law, we review its ruling de novo for legal error.
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