 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Saudi Basic Industries Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co.1/14/2005
to some extent, of Dr. Vogel), the trial court determined that SABIC's first disputed element-an "open and obvious" taking-cannot be located in the works of the Hanbali school. As Mr. Wolfson noted, "the most influential Hanbali scholars, whose works enjoy tremendous respect in Saudi Arabia," do not "include openness or notoriety as elements in the definition of ghasb." Dr. Vogel also agreed that the Hanbali scholars do not include open and notorious in their definition of usurpation, and he conceded that even if the victim is completely unaware that a taking has occurred, the taking qualifies as usurpation:
Q: Now suppose, just suppose, I have a bunch of horses, okay?.. And you come into my corral and take one of my horses, but I'm in Brazil.. So I have no idea that you have in fact taken my horses.. And, indeed, when I come back, I don't know that the horse is gone?.. That would be usurpation, too, wouldn't it?
A: Yes.
In short, the record supports the trial judge's foreign law determination that the Hanbali sources do not require that the wrongful exercise of ownership or possessory rights over the property of another must be "open and obvious." Nor do the Hanbali texts support SABIC's second argued-for element, that the taking must be "intentional." SABIC bases that argument upon the (rejected) testimony of Dr. Vogel, who never identified any Hanbali source that supports a definition of usurpation which includes an element of intentional transgression. Mr. Wolfson, whose testimony the trial judge did accept in some important respects, opined that "the intent to infringe cannot possibly be a necessary element" of a civil claim for usurpation, based on numerous examples of usurpation in the authoritative texts that demonstrate that even an innocent purchaser of wrongfully taken property can be held liable. Although the usurper must "inten to exercise ownership, he need not inten to infringe the rights of the true owner." The trial judge's determination of Saudi law, based entirely on expert testimony, is entitled to deference, as no basis has been shown to overturn it.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court committed no error in submitting the usurpation claim to the jury or in denying SABIC's motion for judgment as a matter of law.
(c) The Claim That The Trial Court Instructed The Jury Erroneously On The Elements of Ghasb
SABIC next argues that even if the trial court was correct in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court erred by not granting SABIC's alternative motion for a new trial. The basis for this argument is that the jury was not, but should have been, told that to find that SABIC committed usurpation, it must find that SABIC's conduct was "open, obvious, intentional, and without color of right." We have rejected that argument as the basis for SABIC's claim of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The argument fares no better when it is recast as a claim of entitlement to a new trial. Because we have upheld the trial court's determination that to constitute usurpation a wrongdoer's conduct need not be open, obvious, or intentional, it follows that the trial court committed no error in refusing to instruct the jury on definitional components that were not elements of that tort under Saudi law.
(d) The Claim That The Trial Court Erroneously
Permitted The Jury To Decide Whether To Award "Enhanced Damages" To ExxonMobil SABIC next contends that the trial court erred by denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law as to the portion of the jury verdict that awarded "enhanced damages" to ExxonMobil. The ground for this claim is that "no Saudi court would award enhanced
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Delaware Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|