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Saudi Basic Industries Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co.1/14/2005
implied duty of good faith, and the doctrines of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. ExxonMobil also demanded a jury trial, to which SABIC made no objection until only weeks before the trial, when SABIC moved (unsuccessfully) to strike the jury trial demand.
On March 21, 2003, at the conclusion of a two week trial, the jury returned a verdict awarding compensatory damages of $220,238,108 to Mobil and $196,642,656 to Exxon. The jury found that SABIC had breached Article 6.3 of both the Yanpet and Kemya joint venture agreements, and also that SABIC had committed the Saudi tort of usurpation ("ghasb") against both Mobil and Exxon.
SABIC claims on this appeal that that jury verdict must be set aside because it was the product of multitudinous rulings, all erroneous as a matter of law, made by the trial judge during the course of the Superior Court action. The rulings that are contested on this appeal fall into five separate groupings. To better understand SABIC's claims on appeal, and our analysis of those claims, the contested rulings are briefly summarized at this point.
(1) The Statute of Limitations Rulings
Before trial, SABIC moved for summary judgment on the ground that ExxonMobil's claims were barred by Delaware's three-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied that motion, holding as a matter of law that (1) under substantive principles of Saudi law (which both sides agree is applicable), ExxonMobil's claims were property rights that could not be barred by the passage of time; and (2) Delaware's borrowing statute (which would have subjected ExxonMobil's claims to the three year limitations period) was inapplicable. The trial court later denied SABIC's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial, holding that the court had previously determined, as a matter of law, that the Delaware three year statute of limitations did not bar ExxonMobil's claims.
(2) The Evidentiary Rulings
Both before and during the trial, the Superior Court made evidentiary rulings. Four of those rulings are contested on this appeal and are next described.
(a) the exclusion of certain testimony by Ibrahim Bin Salamah-proffered by SABIC long after the discovery cutoff date and shortly before trial-that contradicted the prior testimony of Bin Salamah and of another SABIC witness, as well as SABIC's formal admissions that SABIC intended to charge a marked-up royalty to Yanpet and Kemya but never disclosed that intent to its partners;
(b) the admission of an internal memorandum authored by Exxon employee, John Webb, reflecting representations by Mr. Bin Salamah in 1986, that the royalty rates paid by SABIC to UCC for its Unipol(r) PE license were the same as the royalty rates being paid by ExxonMobil as sublicensees of SABIC;
(c) the admission of testimony of Exxon employee George Fitzpatrick, and of Mobil employee Robert Murphy, that SABIC had promised ExxonMobil a "pass through" license, and later represented that it (SABIC) had "passed through" its billings to Kemya and Yanpet at SABIC's cost; and
(d) the limitation of the scope of evidence (proffered by SABIC) of Exxon's subjective intent relating to drafts of agreements that predated the joint venture, and that were never executed, in connection with ExxonMobil's possibly providing polyethene technology to the joint ventures.
(3) The Rulings On SABIC's Defense of Release
One of SABIC's defenses to ExxonMobil's counterclaims was that the 1987 Letter Agreements, wherein ExxonMobil and SABIC renegotiated the joint ventures license fees, operated to release all payment-relate
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