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Saudi Basic Industries Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co.1/14/2005
d claims that ExxonMobil could have brought against SABIC. The trial court granted judgment as a matter of law to ExxonMobil on that release defense on three separate grounds: (i) neither Exxon nor Mobil had signed the 1987 Letter Agreements; (ii) the unambiguous language of those Agreements limited the scope of any release to technology-related claims and did not include payment-related claims; and (iii) the only evidence as to the relevant Saudi law was the unrebutted testimony of Professor Wael B. Hallaq, who opined that the 1987 Letter Agreements would not affect ExxonMobil's claims as a matter of law. After the jury verdict, SABIC renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law, based on the same release defense that the trial judge had previously rejected. The Superior Court denied that motion by order dated August 27, 2003.
(4) The Rulings on ExxonMobil's Claims For Breach of Contract
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found that SABIC was liable to ExxonMobil for having breached Article 6.3 of the joint venture agreements, which (the jury found) was controlling and required SABIC to limit its royalty charges for providing Unipol(r) PE technology to the partnerships to a "pass through" of SABIC's own cost of licensing that same technology from UCC. After the close of the evidence, SABIC moved for judgment as a matter of law on those contract claims. The trial court denied that motion.
After the jury verdict, SABIC renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial. The basis of the renewed motion for judgment was that as a matter of law no reasonable jury could have found for ExxonMobil on their contract claims. The thrust of SABIC's alternative motion for a new trial was that the great weight of the evidence established that the 1980 Unipol(r) PE licenses had superseded and/or modified the joint venture agreements.
The trial court denied both motions, holding that: (a) a reasonable jury could have found that Article 6.3 (which required a cost pass through) governed the terms under which SABIC could sublicense the Unipol(r) PE technology to the joint ventures; and (b) the record dispositively negated SABIC's contention that specific joint venture polyethylene licenses entered into in October and November 1980 had superseded or "trumped" Article 6.3 of the joint venture agreements, because Exxon and Mobil did not sign the sublicenses, and did not understand or intend that the sublicenses would operate to supersede Article 6.3.
(5) The Rulings on ExxonMobil's Tort Claims for "Usurpation"
The jury also found SABIC liable to ExxonMobil for committing the tort known under Saudi law as usurpation (ghasb). The amount of the jury award for usurpation was $416 million, of which $92 million represented Exxon's and Mobil's pro rata share of the amounts that (the jury found) SABIC had overcharged for the Unipol(r) PE technology, and $324 million represented those parties' pro rata share of the profits that SABIC had earned through its use of the overcharges in its business operations.
Following the jury verdict, SABIC filed two separate motions for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial or remittitur on ExxonMobil's ghasb claims. In its first motion, SABIC sought judgment as a matter of law, claiming that there was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for ExxonMobil, and that the evidence overwhelmingly supported a verdict in SABIC's favor. Specifically, SABIC argued that the ghasb verdict was deficient as a matter of law because (1) the trial court declined to instruct the jury that under Saudi law, for SABIC to commit ghasb it must have ac
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