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Lagola v. Thomas1/31/2005
rial judge is a figure having overpowering influence upon the jury. For example, in Price, although the trial judge instructed the jury that he was impartial, this Court held that the trial judge's questioning of an expert witness constituted plain error, warranting a new trial because the trial judge's questions carried a tone of skepticism and the judge had peremptorily rejected the expert's initial opinion on the ground that it lacked a scientific foundation. Here, the trial judge's questioning of none of plaintiff's witnesses but of almost all of the defense witnesses who appeared in person at trial, was fraught with potential adverse implications for the jury to draw, despite the trial judge's subjective intention to help the jury. Furthermore, questions designed by the trial judge here to balance an impression being left with the jury were more appropriate for counsel to ask.
Because we have concluded that a new trial is required on other grounds, we need not decide whether the trial judge's questioning in this case itself constitutes plain error. We do note our concern over the appearance of the questioning in this case, however, and take this opportunity to emphasize the caution required when questioning witnesses because of "'the recognized extraordinary prestige of the trial judge.'" It is the trial judge's duty to maintain an impartial attitude and a status of neutrality and to keep his or her questions and comments in front of the jury to a minimum, including the questioning of witnesses pursuant to Delaware Rule of Evidence 614(b). Self-restraint in the questioning of any witness should be exercised by the trial judge at the new trial.
III. Conclusion
We expressly overrule Laws v. Webb to the extent that it is inconsistent with our holding in Alexander v. Cahill. We conclude that a lay opinion by a police officer who is not qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction about the "primary contributing circumstance" of an accident contravenes Delaware Rule of Evidence 701 and is, therefore, inadmissible. Because the officer's opinion testimony related to causation which was a critical issue in this case where the testimony was in conflict, the admission of that opinion testimony jeopardized the fairness of the trial.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
BERGER, Justice, Concurring with whom STEELE, Chief Justice, Concurs:
Although I agree with the majority's decision to reverse, I write separately to address the trial judge's questioning of Lagola and her witnesses. The majority expressed concern, and cautioned the trial judge to exercise self-restraint, but did not decide whether his questions amounted to plain error. I think it is important to decide this issue because, although trial judges undoubtedly understand the operative principles of self-restraint and impartiality, the general admonitions inPrice v. Blood Bank of Delaware, Inc. provide more guidance when applied to specific fact patterns.
This was a relatively uncomplicated personal injury claim arising from a car accident. Two significant issues in dispute were: i) the speed of Lagola's car prior to impact; and ii) whether Thomas's pain was caused by the accident or by pre-existing degenerative changes in his spine. During the first two days of trial, Thomas presented his case. His witnesses, in addition to himself, were: i) the police officer who responded to the accident, ii) an economist, who testified as to Thomas's lost earnings; iii) two doctors; and iv) a vocational expert. The trial judge asked no questions of any of Thomas's witnesses.
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