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Maggio v. Florida Dep't of Labor and Employment Security3/24/2005
We have for review Maggio v. Department of Labor & Employment Security, 869 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), in which the Second District Court of Appeal certified the following question as a matter of great public importance:
ARE CLAIMS FILED PURSUANT TO THE FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1992 TORT CLAIMS AND THUSSUBJECT TO THE PRESUIT NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 768.28(6), FLORIDA STATUTES (2003)?
Id. at 692. We have jurisdiction.
We rephrase the question as follows:
ARE CLAIMS FILED PURSUANT TO THE FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1992 SUBJECT TO THE PRESUIT NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 768.28(6), FLORIDA STATUTES (2003)?
We answer the rephrasedquestion in the negative and hold that claims filed pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 are not subject to the presuit notice requirements of section 768.28(6).
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Janet Maggio, who is legally blind, was employed by the State of Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security and its successor agency, the State of Florida Agency for Workforce Innovation (collectively the "DLES"), as a customer service specialist from April 15, 1985, until her resignation on May 15, 1998. In compliance with the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Maggio filed a charge of discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC furnished a copy of the charge to the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). After failing to receive a reasonable cause determination from the FCHR, Maggio filed suit against the DLES. In her complaint, filed December 19, 2001, Maggio alleged that the DLES had unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of her handicap in violation of the Act. The DLES filed a motion to dismiss for Maggio's noncompliance with the statutory presuit notice requirements of section 768.28(6).
The trial court found that Maggio's claim was a tort claim, and thus subject to the presuit notice requirements delineated in section 768.28(6). The trial court also foundthat it was impossible at that point for Maggio to comply with these requirements because the three-year period for notifying the State of a claim against it had expired. Therefore, the trial court dismissed Maggio's complaint with prejudice.
On appeal, the Second District affirmed. Persuaded by the analysisand reasoning in Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 572 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990) (Scott II), and Bearelly v. State Department of Corrections, No. 63-2001-CA-046, 2002 WL 982429 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. Apr. 10, 2002), the Second District concludedthat Maggio's claim was a tort claim because it arose from"personal rights that are granted and guaranteed by legislative act,"and existed independent of the employment contract. Maggio, 869 So. 2d at 691. However, because there was no controlling precedent specifically holding that disability discrimination claims brought pursuant to the Act are subject to the presuitnotice requirements of section 768.28(6), the Second District certified the question to this Court as a matter of great public importance.
II. ANALYSIS
To answer the rephrasedquestion, we must determine whether the Legislature intended claims filed under the Florida Civil Rights Act to be subject to the presuit notice requirements of section 768.28(6). Statutory construction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So. 2d 287, 289 (Fla. 2003).
"When construing a statutory provision, legislative intent is the polestar that guides" the Court's inquiry. State v. Rife, 789 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla. 2001) (quoting McLaughlin v. State, 721 So. 2d 1
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