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Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Heveder6/28/2005
of the proceeds or payments in accordance with the terms of the policy or contract or in accordance with any written assignment of the policy or contract, the person then designated in the policy or contract or by the assignment as being entitled to the proceeds or payments, if legally competent, shall be entitled to receive the proceeds or payments and to give full acquittance for the proceeds or payments and the payments shall fully discharge the insurer from all claims under the policy or contract unless, before payment is made, the insurer has received at its home office written notice by or on behalf of some other person that the other person claims to be entitled to the payment or some interest in the policy or contract.
(Emphasis supplied.) This statute was enacted as part of the 1960 Georgia insurance code, Ga. L. 1960, p. 289 at 669, §56-2424, but the meaning of the phrase at issue here has never been construed by this court or the Georgia Supreme Court.
Well-established principles of statutory construction require that " he literal meaning of the words of a statute must be followed unless the result is an absurdity, contradiction, or such an inconvenience that it is clear that the legislature must have intended something else." (Citation omitted.) Mansfield v. Pannell, 261 Ga. 243, 244 (404 SE2d 104) (1991).
We must seek to effectuate the intent of the legislature, OCGA § 1-3-1 (a), and to give each part of the statute meaning and avoid constructions that make some language mere surplusage. All parts of a statute should be harmonized and given sensible and intelligent effect, because it is not presumed that the legislature intended to enact meaningless language.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) J. Kinson Cook, Inc. v. Weaver, 252 Ga. App. 868, 870 (556 SE2d 831) (2001).
Here, the plain meaning of the statute is clear. It discharges the insurer from liability unless, before payment is made, the insurer receives written notice by or on behalf of another claimant to the policy proceeds. Heveder has admitted that neither he nor anyone acting on his behalf sent Colonial a claim notice "of any kind" asserting that he or any person other than the named beneficiary claimed the proceeds of the policy. This admission is dispositive. Heveder did not comply with the provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41, and Colonial's payment to the named beneficiary discharges it from further obligation as a matter of law. The Supreme Court of Alabama reached a similar result in Alfa Life Ins. Co. v. Culverhouse, 729 So2d 325 (Ala. 1999), construing the virtually identical provision of § 27-14-24, Ala. Code 1975. While a decision by a court of another state is in no way binding on the courts of Georgia, we may adopt its reasoning if we find it sound and persuasive. Board of Trustees v. Christy, 246 Ga. 553, 554 (1) (272 SE2d 288) (1980), overruled in part on other grounds, Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Stevens, 278 Ga. 166, 167 (598 SE2d 456) (2004). In this case, we find the reasoning of the Alabama Supreme Court sound and in accord with our interpretation of the similar Georgia statute.
The cases cited by Heveder deal, not with the application of OCGA § 33-24-41, but with bad faith refusal to pay a claim under OCGA § 33-4-6. Because Heveder admits he did not file a claim, demand or notice of any kind with Colonial before payment of the policy proceeds, and Colonial paid the only claim before it, those cases are inapplicable here.
Heveder also argues that the insurance investigator's report and other documents in Colonial's files should have placed Colonial on notice that his father's death was a homicide, that Mrs. Heveder was a suspect, a
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