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Ratcliff v. Graether5/13/2005
r the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known . . . of the existence of, the injury . . . for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of the dates occurs first . . . .
Iowa Code ยง 614.1(9)(a) (2003) (emphasis added).
The italicized language is the legislature's discovery rule and means the statute of limitations "begins to run when the patient knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, of the injury for which damages are sought." Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Iowa 1995). "Injury" for the purposes of this discovery rule means physical harm rather than the wrongful act that caused the injury. Schlote v. Dawson, 676 N.W.2d 187, 193 (Iowa 2004), disavowed on other grounds by Christy v. Miulli, 692 N.W.2d 694, 701 n.1 (Iowa 2005). In Schlote, we held the removal of plaintiff's voice box was the injury and not the alleged unnecessary and excessive treatment in removing it. Id. at 194. Because the plaintiff knew that the surgery would result in removal of his voice box, we held the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the surgery. This was more than two years before the plaintiff filed suit, resulting in the action being time-barred. Id.
Underlying the discovery rule is inquiry notice. We explained inquiry notice in Langner:
he statute [of limitations] begins to run when a person gains knowledge sufficient to put the person on inquiry. On that date, the person is charged with knowledge of facts that would have been disclosed by a reasonably diligent investigation. Moreover, once a person is aware that a problem exists, the person has a duty to investigate even though the person may not have knowledge of the nature of the problem that caused the injury.
533 N.W.2d at 518.
Here, by Ratcliff's own admission, he was aware of an eye problem on May 1, 1997, the day following surgery on his left eye. He was on inquiry notice at that point which charged him with knowledge of facts that would have been disclosed by a reasonably diligent investigation. And by his own admission, he knew on May 13, 1997 that there might have been an overcorrection when Graether told him so. Finally, by his own admission, when he left Mauer's office in December 1997, he knew that Mauer believed the April 30, 1997 procedure was the cause of his visual problems in his left eye. Graether's and Mauer's comments amounted to actual notice on the part of Ratcliff of his left eye injury. Ratcliff did not file suit until November 16, 2000, more than two years later. His action was therefore time-barred, unless, as he urges, we adopt the continuous treatment doctrine to toll the statute of limitations. Although we have been urged to adopt the doctrine in two cases, see McClendon v. Beck, 569 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Iowa 1997) and Langner, 533 N.W.2d at 519, we have yet to adopt it.
The so-called "continuous treatment" doctrine as generally formulated at common law provides that if the treatment by the doctor is a continuing course and the patient's disease or condition is of such a nature as to impose on the doctor a duty of continuing treatment and care, the statute does not commence running until treatment by the [doctor] for the particular disease or condition involved has terminated, unless during the course of treatment the patient learns or should reasonably have learned of the harm, in which case the statute runs from the time of knowledge, actual or constructive.
Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 215 A.2d 825, 827-28 (Md. 1966) (emphasis added). The doctrine was adopted as a "judicial effort to soften the harshness of the statutory accrual rule existing in
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