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McElroy v. State6/17/2005
strative Remedies
In the district court, the defendants objected to the trial of McElroy's retaliation claims because she had not exhausted her administrative remedies. Specifically, the defendants claimed McElroy had only notified the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) about her federal and state sex discrimination claims, not her retaliation claims. We consider the federal and state claims separately.
1. Title VII
Title VII explicitly prohibits both sex discrimination and retaliation. See 42 U.S.C. ยง 2000e et seq.
However, Title VII establishes an administrative procedure which a complaining employee must follow . . . . Exhaustion of administrative remedies is central to Title VII's statutory scheme because it provides the [administrative agency] the first opportunity to investigate discriminatory practices and enables it to perform its roles of obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliatory efforts.
Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Exhaustion of administrative remedies under Title VII requires a claimant to give notice of all claims in the initial administrative complaint. Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 630-31 (8th Cir. 2000).
McElroy filed her complaint with the ICRC on March 14, 1997. (The same complaint was cross-filed with the EEOC). She used the standard form, which requires complainants to identify the bases of their harassment claims by checking the applicable boxes. McElroy checked the box labeled "sex" but not the "retaliation" box. When the ICRC asked McElroy to state in narrative fashion why she felt she was discriminated against, McElroy described Glass's continuing harassment. Although she indicated the defendants were not adequately addressing this ongoing harassment, she did not describe any acts of retaliation. Indeed, the reviewing officer specifically noted that "the only issue is whether [the defendants] took reasonable measures to stop the harassment and keep [McElroy] from working in a hostile environment." Because McElroy did not allege retaliation, she therefore failed to exhaust her Title VII remedies with respect to alleged retaliation-in-employment. See Williams, 21 F.3d at 222-23 (arriving at similar conclusion on analogous facts; holding plaintiff not entitled to pursue sexual discrimination claim because she did not check "sex" box and confined her narrative discussion to retaliation).
It is true the administrative complaint must be construed liberally to further the remedial purpose of the civil rights laws. Nichols v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 154 F. 3d 875, 886-87 (8th Cir. 1998). For this reason, in spite of the foregoing discussion " plaintiff will be deemed to have exhausted administrative remedies as to allegations contained in a judicial complaint that are like or reasonably related to the substance of charges timely brought before [the administrative agency]." Williams, 21 F. 3d at 222. Allegations that are not so related must be dismissed, however, because allowing a plaintiff to pursue them in court would circumvent the statutory scheme which requires the use of administrative proceedings. See Duncan v. Delta Consol. Indus., Inc., 371 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2004).
Although at first glance one might think sex discrimination and attendant retaliation are "reasonably related," "it is well established that retaliation claims are not reasonably related to underlying discrimination claims." Wallin v. Minn. Dep't of Corrections, 153 F. 3d 681, 688 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Duncan, 371 F.3d at 1025; Russell v. TG Missouri Corp., 340 F.3d 735, 74
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