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Schaffer v. Curtis-Perrin3/25/2005
not said why). On appeal we reversed, noting " mple evidence in the record show that [defendant's] insurer made payments to or for the Potters with respect to property damage and [plaintiff's] medical bills." Id. at 433, 599 P.2d at 1004. The opinion did not disclose how much had been paid and, apparently, the question of how to identify how much of plaintiff's "personal injury" damages included creditable expenses was not raised.
The same non-treatment of the issue exists in Leavitt. Plaintiff sued and sought reimbursement for medical expenses and damages for pain and suffering and loss of past and future earning capacity. 133 Idaho at 626-27, 991 P.2d at 351-53. Defendant's insurance company had paid $7,000 of plaintiff's medical expenses prior to trial. Id. at 632, 991 P.2d at 357. In affirming the lower court's order reducing the award for medical payments, the opinion announced only that " hen a party makes pre-litigation payments to the other side, the paying party is allowed to subtract those payments from the jury's verdict." Id., 991 P.2d at 357. Again, no special verdict form was required, but neither was the issue raised.
Schaffer raises a good point. Obviously, it is impossible to know with absolute certainty whether, or to what extent, the jury's award included the medical expenses for which Schaffer was already reimbursed by Curtis-Perrin's carrier. Accordingly, whether we grant the credit or do not grant the credit, either alternative carries a certain risk of error. Grant the credit, and we risk erroneously depriving Schaffer of part of her general damages award-the sum the jury determined would be just and proper under all the circumstances. Owen v. Taylor, 62 Idaho 408, 114 P.2d 258 (1941). Refuse to grant the credit, and we risk erroneously denying Curtis-Perrin her statutory right to a credit for the expenses her carrier paid and which plaintiff recovered at trial. Nevertheless, we can in this case, on these facts, affirm the district court's ruling with little risk that doing so will erroneously tap into Schaffer's general damages award. A decision of the Supreme Court of Montana, employing essentially the same approach the district court used in this case, guides the way.
In Cottrell v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 863 P.2d 381 (Mont. 1993), the plaintiff, an employee of the defendant, was injured on the job while operating some equipment. 863 P.2d at 383. His employer advanced him funds for, among other things, wage benefits totaling approximately $300,000. Id. at 389. At trial, the plaintiff sought recovery for wage loss totaling more than $862,000 and general damages between $700,000 and $1 million. Id. The opinion did not say whether evidence of the employer's payments was introduced. The jury awarded plaintiff a total of $1,362,236, but did not specify whether any portion covered wage loss. Id. Defendant sought a credit for the wage loss funds it advanced and the plaintiff lodged precisely the same sort of objection Schaffer lodges here -- that the court could not possibly know whether any amounts were awarded for wage loss. The court acknowledged it could not know for sure whether any amounts were for wage loss, but granted the credit anyway, reasoning as follows:
he jury's verdict was for an amount in excess of $1.3 million. [The plaintiff] claimed wage loss in the amount of $862,230, and general damages of from $700,000 to $1,000,000 for pain and suffering. By logical deduction, at least $300,000 of [the plaintiff's] recovery had to be compensation for wage loss.
Id. at 389.
The same reasoning is appropriate in this case. Here, Schaffer sought approximately $26,000 in medical expenses, which included the expe
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