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Page v. McCain Foods2/17/2005
ile the Commission did not make findings or a conclusion concerning the employer's knowledge, this Court held that there was no evidence in the record supporting a conclusion that the employer had any knowledge that would waive the written notice requirement.
In Murray-Donahue, an employee was on a business trip for her employer. When retrieving her luggage from a baggage claim at an airport, the employee suffered an injury to her back. The employee testified that " erbally I had notified [my supervisor] that we had difficulty in Boston and that I was having problems with my back." While the Commission found this was inadequate notice of an accident or injury, the Commission failed to make a finding regarding the knowledge in the possession of the employer. This Court remanded the case for an appropriate fact-finding.
In this case, the Commission found that Page's testimony on the issue of notice was "ambiguous, conflicting, and not enough to give Employer notice of an accident, but rather mere discomfort unconnected with a work-related injury." On direct examination of Page, the following evidence was adduced:
Q: Talk to me about what you told Lonny and what he said to you during the context of this telephone conversation.
A: I told Lonny that my knee had locked up and it was really hurting and could he give me somebody to replace me, and he said no, he didn't have anybody. . . . .
Q: Okay. Did you tell Lonny that your knee had locked up while you tried to get up from the computer table?
A: Yes, I told him -- He didn't ask me. I just told him that I was sitting there on the chair doing the key report, is what I told him, because that's what we were sitting there to do, and it locked up . . . .
On cross-examination, no statements were elicited to contradict Page's testimony. Page's first statement establishes an injury but does not provide a cause. Page's second statement is a response to a question that incorporates a cause. In total, Page testified that she told her supervisor that her knee had locked up when she attempted to stand from a seated position at a table where she was engaged in a duty of her employment. This provided the supervisor with knowledge of the injury and the source of the injury. Page's first statement does not contradict her second statement in any fashion. The Commission's conclusion is not supported by substantial, competent evidence.
The facts of this case place it under the requirements of I.C. § 72-704, the exceptions to giving written notice or giving inadequate notice. By the express language of I.C. § 72-704, "Want of notice or delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to proceedings under this law if it is shown that the employer, his agent or representative had knowledge of the injury." (Emphasis added.) The uncontroverted testimony of Page establishes that she told her supervisor that she was sitting in a chair doing the key report and her knee locked upon standing up. While the language of Murray-Donahue states that the employer should have "considerable knowledge" it is difficult to imagine what further information Page could have provided.
Idaho's workers' compensation law is remedial legislation. It is a well-known canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation is to be liberally construed to give effect to the intent of the legislature. State By and Through Alan G. Lance v. Hobby Horse Ranch Tractor and Equip. Co., 129 Idaho 565, 567, 929 P.2d 741, 743 (1996) (citing NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.01 at 147 (5th ed. 1992)). The intent of the Idaho
Legislature in enacting the workers' compensation law was to
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