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Kirk v. Ford Motor Co.6/23/2005
rve the issue for appeal. Id. at 700, 760 P.2d at 39 (citing Davidson v. Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560, 733 P.2d 781 (Ct. App. 1986) rev'd and aff'd Davidson, 114 Idaho 107, 753 P.2d 1253 (1987)).
The district court originally granted the Kirks' motion in limine regarding seatbelt evidence. However, this grant was qualified by the following language, " xcept as the Court may permit by supplemental motion prior to trial or at trial and heard outside of the hearing of the jury . . ." During trial and outside the presence of the jury, Ford reminded the court of its intention to call Moffatt to the stand as an expert witness. Part of this discussion involved the admissibility of seatbelt evidence in regards to the addition of a punitive damage claim by the Kirks. Ford's intention to present seatbelt evidence was clearly stated. The Kirks did not state an objection or respond to Ford's statements on the record. The following day, the district court allowed Moffatt to testify without additional comment. The Kirks did not object to Moffatt's testimony. They stipulated in front of the jury that the decedents were unbelted at the time of the accident. Similar to Gunter and Karlson, the seatbelt order was a qualified ruling on the admissibility of seatbelt evidence. The Kirks and the district court were advised of the proposed evidence and the basis for its offer. The Kirks were required to renew their objection. They waived objection to the admission of seatbelt evidence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the presentation of the evidence.
IV. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 11 WAS PROPER
The Kirks argue the district court improperly gave Jury Instruction No. 11 which stated, "You may consider the fact that plaintiff's 1991 Navajo-Explorer was equipped with functional seat belts for the purpose of determining whether the overall design of the vehicle was unreasonably dangerous. However, you may not consider the use or non-use of seat belts in determining whether either Kyle Kirk or Bret Humphrey were negligent, in the sense of misuse of the product, or whether use or non-use of a seat belt caused either death."
The jury instruction is consistent with I.C. § 49-673(8). Apparently it was a curative attempt in light of the seatbelt testimony. In any event, it appears the instruction was irrelevant to the jury's decision. The special verdict made these specific findings:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was defendant Ford Motor Company negligent?
ANSWER: Yes ______ No [checkbld]
QUESTION NO. 2: Is Ford Motor Company strictly liable for an unreasonably dangerous defective condition of the Navajo-Explorer?
ANSWER: Yes ______ No [checkbld]
QUESTION NO. 3: Did Ford Motor Company fail to adequately warn Kyle Kirk and/or Bret Humphrey?
ANSWER: Yes ______ No [checkbld]
As a consequence of the answers to the first three questions, no other questions were answered. The jury never reached the issue of any negligence by Kyle and Bret.
The Court presumes a jury will follow a proper limiting instruction. I.R.E. 105 (2004). Jury Instruction No. 11 was consistent with I.C. § 49-673(8). Further, the special verdict indicates that the jury never reached the issues covered by the instruction.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY LIMITED BIDEZ'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
The Kirks argue that the district court compounded the error in its decision to allow Moffatt to present seatbelt evidence by limiting the testimony of their expert rebuttal witness, Bidez. Ford responds that the district court properly limited the testimony because it would have brought in a new claim of pr
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