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People v. Jones2/3/2005
2(c)(2) must be construed to prohibit nonconsensual testing of a suspected driver in situations not involving death or bodily injury. Conversely, the majority's interpretation renders section 11-501.2(c)(2) meaningless surplusage and enactment of the statute pointless.
Additionally, the legislative debates negate the majority's conclusion that section 11-501.2(c)(2) applies when no death or personal injury to another occurs. "Valuable construction aids in interpreting an ambiguous statute are the provision's legislative history and debates, and the purposes and underlying policies." Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 19 (1996). On May 20, 1994, during the third reading of House Bill 3094 in the Senate, Senator Raica stated:
"What House Bill 3094 does is provides that if a police officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle is being driven by a person who's under the influence and that individual has caused the death or personal injury , the officer can require the person to submit to a drug, breath, or urine test." 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 20, 1994, at 110 (statements of Senator Raica).
On June 14, 1994, during the House debate on House Bill 3094, the following exchange occurred:
"Deering: Senate Amendment #1 as I understand it, requires a driver to submit to a breath or urine test under stated circumstances, what are those circumstances?
Dart: They've killed somebody or they've caused major injury to them.
Deering: So it's not if they get pulled over for suspected DUI ?
Dart: Correct, correct. There has to be probable cause that the death of the person was based upon their actions or that the severe injury was.
Deering: Thank you." 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 14, 1994, at 116 (statements of Representatives Deering & Dart).
Thus, the legislative debates show that the legislature did not intend the result obtained by the majority.
Finally, the majority is inconsistent when it asserts " e do not suggest that a DUI arrestee's lack of a right to refuse chemical testing under section 11-501.2(c)(2) permits law enforcement officers to use physical force in obtaining blood, urine, and breath samples." Slip op. at 11. Essentially, the majority concludes that a suspected impaired driver does not have the right to refuse chemical testing, yet law enforcement officers do not have the right to compel nonconsensual testing. If law enforcement officers may not employ compulsion, how does the majority suggest law enforcement officers obtain the samples?
In sum, Jones was arrested for driving under the influence and the alleged violation did not result in death or personal injury to another. It was, therefore, statutorily improper for the law enforcement officer to order blood and urine samples to be taken over Jones' objection. For these reasons I would affirm the circuit court and appellate court rulings suppressing the test results.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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