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Ott v. Alliedsignal5/19/2005
res us to determine whether the statute of repose may be applied constitutionally to preclude claims caused by newer products when those claims have a longer latency period while shorter-latency claims caused by identical products are not precluded, but may proceed under the ten-year repose statute. We apply the standard in Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994):
First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. Finally, in determining whether a statute complies with or violates Section 23, courts must exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion.
We must, therefore, determine whether inherent characteristics distinguish longer-latency claims from shorter-latency claims when both types of claims are caused by products of equal age and whether the different treatment of those claims by the statute of repose is reasonably related to those inherent characteristics. Our supreme court already has indicated that the purposes served by the statute of repose are threefold: to recognize that claims arising long after the product is delivered are less likely to be caused by defects in the product; to give manufacturers certainty regarding when their liability for defective products is cut off; and to ensure that evidence and witnesses are fresh. McIntosh, 729 N.E.2d at 980-81. We should apply Section 23 in light of these purposes.
As to the first of these three purposes, we see no inherent differences between the classifications. Regarding illnesses linked to occupational exposure to asbestos, causation is equally attributable to the product whether the illness manifests immediately or decades later. As to causation by the product, there is no inherent difference between short-latency illnesses caused by asbestos and longer-latency illnesses caused by asbestos that is rationally related to different treatment of the two classes.
Regarding the second rationale for the repose statute, in contrast, there is an inherent difference between long-latency and short-latency illnesses that supports different treatment of the two classes. Our supreme court has held that it is rational and permissible for the General Assembly to set a firm date after which manufacturers of products can know with certainty that they no longer have liability for harms caused by products they put into the stream of commerce more than a decade earlier. McIntosh, 729 N.E.2d at 981. Barring long-latency claims while permitting short-latency claims is consistent with this statutory purpose. Moreover, the different treatment tracks the inherent difference that permitting long-latency claims would leave liability open for manufacturers perpetually, while permitting only short-latency claims cuts off liability at an ascertainable time.
As to the third purpose, there are undoubtedly inherent differences between claims raised long after the product was put in use and claims raised closer to the time the product was put in use. A long lapse of time between the victim's exposure to the product and the time the victim's illness manifests would create significant proof problems because evidence would have been lost and witnesses' memories would have faded. In contrast, evidence is often more readily available and witnesses' memories are fresher when litigation occurs closer to the time of exposure to the occupational hazard. This inherent difference also could be a rational reason for different treatment of the two classes.
Because there are at lea
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