Schultz v. Ford Motor Co.2/21/2005
g state common law standards of care. Compliance with such standards would thus not necessarily shield any person from product liability at common law." S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1996 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2709, 2720. The House report stated that "[Congress] intended, and [the savings clause] specifically establishes, that compliance with safety standards is not to be a defense or otherwise to affect the rights of parties under common law, particularly those relating to . . . tort liability." H.R.Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1966). " he saving clause reflects a congressional determination that occasional nonuniformity is a small price to pay for a system in which juries not only create, but also enforce, safety standards, while simultaneously providing necessary compensation to victims." Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 1913, 120 S. Ct. 1913, 1920, 146 L.Ed. 2d 914 (2000).
Rogers ex rel. Rogers v. Cosco, Inc., 737 N.E.2d 1158, 1164-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.
FMVSS 216 is a safety standard pertaining to roof crush resistance. It was adopted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in 1971 and had changed little by the time of the Schultzes' 1997 accident.
Product Liability
"In modern usage, the phrase `products liability' refers broadly to the decisional and statutory law permitting money damages to be levied against manufacturers and sellers of defective products that injure persons or property." 1 David G. Owen, M. Stuart Madden, Mary J. Davis, Madden & Owen on Products Liability § 1.5 at 14-15 (3d ed. 2000). Prior to passage of the IPLA, "Indiana recognized strict liability in tort as embodied in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), which imposes liability on manufacturers and sellers for injuries caused by unreasonably dangerous products." Reed v. Central Soya Co., Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (Ind. 1993), modified on other grounds by 644 N.E.2d 84 (Ind. 1994) (citing Ayr-Way Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood, 261 Ind. 86, 93, 300 N.E.2d 335, 340 (1973)).
The IPLA was enacted in 1978. Progressive Ins. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 749 N.E.2d 484, 487 n.2 (Ind. 2001). As originally enacted, it covered claims in tort under theories of negligence and strict liability. Id. (citing IC 33-1-1.5-1 (1983) (now repealed)). In 1983, the IPLA was amended to apply to strict liability actions only. Pub.L. No. 297-1983, § 1. These strict liability claims merged the concept of implied warranty with the tort of negligence. In these suits, it was unnecessary to have direct privity between the seller and the defendant, and liability attached even if the manufacturer's quality control in producing the defective product was reasonable. 3 Madden & Owen on Products Liability, app. B, § 1 at 33. In 1995, the legislature reversed course and changed the IPLA to once again cover both negligence and strict liability claims. Progressive Ins., 749 N.E.2d at 487 n.2 (citing Pub.L. No. 278-1995, § 1).
After the enactment of the 1995 amendments, recovery under the IPLA for strict liability was available only in manufacturing defect cases, i.e., where an injured party claims that a product fails to conform to plans and specifications as a result of a manufacturing defect. Joseph R. Alberts, David M. Henn, Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Product Liability Law, 34 Ind. L. Rev. 857, 882 (2001); James L. Petersen, Tort Reform, Act No. 1741, 39 Res Gestae 24, 24 (Sept. 1995). By contrast, proof of negligence was required to recover in cases alleging a failure to adequately warn or, in a case such as this, to recover for damages caused by a defect in product design
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