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Schultz v. Ford Motor Co.2/21/2005
the United States or by Indiana, or by an agency of the United States or Indiana.
IC 34-20-5-1 (emphasis added).
Indiana Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 7.05(D) was modeled after this statute and provides:
The defendant has alleged the product was manufactured in conformity with the state of the art [or complied with applicable codes]. The defendant has the burden of proving this allegation.
If you find the defendant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that before the product was sold by the manufacturer, the product:
1. was in conformity with the generally recognized state of the art applicable to the safety of the product at the time the product was designed, manufactured, packaged, and labeled; or
1.complied with applicable codes, standards, regulations, or specifications established, adopted, promulgated, or approved by the United States or by Indiana, or by an agency of the United States or Indiana.
then you may presume the product was not defective [or the defendant was not negligent] and find for the defendant.
However, if the plaintiff has introduced evidence tending to disprove either of the above propositions,000000 then you may, but are not required to, find the product was defective.
Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction (Civil) 7.05(D) (2d ed. 2003) (emphasis added).
The trial court instructed the jury using Instruction 23, which in turn was modeled after Pattern Instruction 7.05(D) and provided as follows:
Ford Motor Company has alleged that the Plaintiffs' 1995 Ford Explorer complied with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216. Ford Motor Company has the burden of proving this allegation.
If you find Ford Motor Company has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that before the 1995 Ford Explorer was sold by Ford Motor Company that it complied with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216 then you may presume that Ford Motor Company was not negligent in its design of the 1995 Ford Explorer and that the Ford Explorer was not defective.
However, the Plaintiffs may rebut this presumption if they introduced evidence tending to show that the 1995 Ford Explorer was defective.
Appellants' Appendix at 54 (emphasis added).
III. Presumptions versus Inferences
On appeal, the Schultzes argue that it was reversible error for the trial court to use Instruction 23 to inform the jury about the governmental compliance presumption. Specifically, the Schultzes contend that it was error for the trial court to use Instruction 23 because: (1) the governmental compliance presumption in IC 34-20-5-1, the statute upon which the instruction is based, has no evidentiary value; and (2) the only purpose of IC 34-20-5-1 is to impose a burden upon the plaintiff to produce evidence to rebut the presumption and, once that burden is met, the presumption serves no further purpose and drops from the case. Appellants' Brief at 9 (citing Cansler v. Mills, 765 N.E.2d 698, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied; McClain v. Chem-Lube Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1096, 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied (2002)). We agree.
The Schultzes assert that IC 34-20-5-1 creates a rebuttable presumption, which imposes a burden of production-not proof-and, hence, is an improper subject of jury instruction. Ford replies that the presumption of non-negligence under the IPLA is closer to a statutorily recognized inference and, as such, is appropriate for use as an instruction to the jury. Because this distinction is key to our holding in this case, we provide background on these two concepts.
I
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