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Pendleton v. Aguilar5/19/2005
llenges Pendleton's claim of future lost earnings alleging that his medical condition does not preclude his continued employment as a long distance truck driver. With regard to his continued employment as a truck driver, Dr. Keller testified that Pendleton incurred a permanent impairment which will only worsen over time. Also, Dr. Charles Scarborough determined that the physical demands of a truck driver would continue to bruise the nerve root thereby making Pendleton's injuries permanent and progressive.
We have held before that where the evidence is variable or conflicting as to the nature, extent, and source of the injury , the jury is in the best position to determine the amount of damages, and we will not disturb that award. Centennial Mortgage Inc. v. Blumenfeld, 745 N.E.2d 268, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Based on the circumstances of this case, we do not find the jury verdict to be wholly unwarranted. See Paragon Family Rest., 799 N.E.2d at 1056. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error by denying a new trial where the evidence is conflicting. Dughaish, 729 N.E.2d at 170.
B. Uninsured Motorist Reimbursements
Last, Aguilar argues that the trial court erred in excluding the collateral source payments made by the uninsured motorist carrier for Pendleton's employer. In particular, Aguilar alleges that evidence of collateral source payments made to Pendleton by his employer's uninsured motorist carrier does not qualify as one of the statutory exceptions to the general rule of admissibility of collateral source payments and, thus, should have been presented to the jury.
As with our review of Pendleton's contention regarding Indiana's Collateral Source Payments, we also determine Aguilar's argument on a de novo basis. See Indiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Blickensderfer, 778 N.E.2d 439, 441 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Thus, we are not bound by a trial court's legal interpretation of a statute and need not give it deference. Id. We independently determine the statute's meaning and apply it to the facts before us. Id.
Here, the record indicates that at the time of the accident, Pendleton was insured for uninsured motorist coverage under a policy issued and paid for by his employer. During trial, Aguilar raised the admissibility of Pendleton's receipt of the uninsured motorist settlement under the Indiana Collateral Source Rule. However, the trial court denied its admissibility. The record further established that the trial court, nevertheless, provided a post-verdict set-off in the amount of $40,000 uninsured motorist coverage limit pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Illinois Act in its Order of March 2, 2004.
In Peele v. Gillespie, 658 N.E.2d 954 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), reh'g denied, trans. denied, we were also confronted with collateral source payments originating from an underinsured motorist carrier. In Peele, we focused on the payee of the benefits and stated that "the [Indiana Collateral Source Rule] clearly states that collateral source payments in the nature of insurance benefits which the plaintiff or a member of his family have paid for directly are not admissible as evidence." Id. at 958. We premised that if "the legislature intended to exclude underinsured motorist benefits paid to an insured by his own insurer from the broad category of insurance benefits, . . . it could have done so." Id. Thus, based on our standard of review, we refused to read such an exception into the statute. Id.
Unlike Peele, in the case before us today, the record clearly establishes that neither Pendleton, nor his family, paid directly for the uninsured motorist benefits. Instead, Pendleton's employer not only en
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