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Gray v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.1/27/2005
the Indiana Constitution. Article I, Section 23, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, states that " he General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens."
Chrysler argues that previous decisions of this court and of our supreme court have already determined that Indiana Code section 22-3-7- 9(f) is constitutional. Our research has uncovered several relevant cases. In Poke v. Peerless Foundry Co., 127 Ind. App. 348, 141 N.E.2d 133 (1957) and Woldridge v. Ball Bros. Co., 129 Ind. App. 420, 150 N.E.2d 911 (1958), employees sought benefits through the Occupational Diseases Act, under the statute that was the predecessor to the statute at issue here, for disability they suffered due to their work-related exposure to silica dust. The statute provided then, as it still does today, that any claim must be brought within three years of the employee's last work-related exposure to silica dust or be barred. Neither employee argued that the time limitation in the statute was unconstitutional. The Board found that each employee's claim was barred because his disablement had not occurred within three years of his last silica exposure and we affirmed both of these decisions. Poke, 141 N.E.2d at 135; Woldridge, 150 N.E.2d at 913.
Several years later, in Bunker v. National Gypsum Co., 426 N.E.2d 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), an employee, Bunker, who suffered from asbestosis, did challenge the constitutionality of Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f). National Gypsum employed Bunker from 1949 to 1966. From 1949 to 1950, Bunker was exposed to asbestos fibers. Bunker learned that he had asbestosis in 1976, and filed a claim for disability benefits under the Occupational Diseases Act in 1978. The Board found that Bunker's claim was barred because his disability had not arisen within three years of his last work-related exposure to asbestos. Bunker appealed, arguing that the three-year time limit for filing a claim imposed by Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f) deprived him of his constitutional right to due process. After considering medical evidence regarding the latency period of asbestos, we agreed with Bunker that Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f) as applied violated his constitutional right to due process. 426 N.E.2d at 425.
However, on transfer, our supreme court reversed. Bunker, 441 N.E.2d at 14. The court concluded that we erred by using medical evidence concerning asbestos. Id. at 11. The court stated that "the Court of Appeals has in effect rewritten this law thereby usurping the legislature's constitutionally mandated function. If we were to affirm the Court of Appeals in their decision, the legislative intent to provide a definitive time period within which all occupational disease claims must be brought would be frustrated." Id. at 13. The court concluded that the three-year time limitation in Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f) did not violate Bunker's constitutional right to due process. Id.
We recently considered the constitutionality of Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f) in Stytle. There, the employee, Stytle, worked for Angola Die Casting from 1984 through 1990. After leaving Angola, Stytle was diagnosed with possible Alzheimer's disease and became totally disabled in 1998. In 2000, a psychiatrist concluded that Stytle's exposure to aluminum during his employment at Angola might have caused his cognitive problems. That same year, Stytle filed an application for adjustment of claim against Angola. Angola filed a motion to dismiss. The Board granted Angola's motion to dismiss concluding that Stytle's claim was barred because his disablement did not occur within two years of his
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