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Gray v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.1/27/2005
last work-related exposure to aluminum.
On appeal, Stytle argued that Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f) as applied violated Article I, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution, the Open Courts Clause. We began our review by considering our supreme court's decision in Bunker. We noted that in Bunker, our supreme court stated that `" he legislature has the sole duty and responsibility to determine what constitutes a reasonable time for the bringing of an action unless the period allowed is so manifestly insufficient that it represents a denial of justice."' Stytle, 806 N.E.2d at 344 (quoting Bunker, 441 N.E.2d at 12). We concluded that Indiana Code section 22-3- 7-9(f)'s two-year statute of repose was not so manifestly insufficient that it represented a denial of justice. Stytle, 806 N.E.2d at 345. We ultimately held that Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f) as applied did not violate Article I, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution. Id.
We recognize that both Bunker and Stytle have addressed the constitutionality of Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f). However, neither of these cases addressed whether Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1) as applied violated Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. Furthermore, neither of these cases specifically considered the statute at issue here, which is Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1). Therefore, we must proceed to consider whether Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1) as applied violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution.
Our supreme court has specified that Article , Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution imposes two requirements upon statutes that grant unequal privileges or immunities to differing classes of persons. First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. Finally, in determining whether a statute complies with or violates Section 23, courts must exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion.
Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994).
Gray begins by arguing that Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f) as applied violates Article I, Section 23 because it grants unequal privileges and immunities to the broad class of individuals who suffer from occupational diseases. She points out that Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f) confers preferential treatment upon individuals exposed to radiation that is not equally available to individuals who, for instance, are exposed to silica or coal dust. Indiana Code section 22- 3-7-9(f)(2) affords the "discovery" rule to individuals exposed to radiation. This means that these individuals can receive compensation so long as their disablement "occurs within two (2) years from the date on which the employee had knowledge of the nature of his occupational disease or, by exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the existence of such disease and its causal relationship to his employment." Ind. Code § 22-3-7-9(f)(2). Such a benefit is not extended to individuals who are exposed to silica or coal dust. These individuals' claims are barred unless disablement occurs within three years of their last exposure to the hazard. Ind. Code § 22-3-7-9(f)(1).
However, all individuals who suffer from an occupational disease are not similarly situated. Not all individuals with an occupational disease have been exposed to the same sort of work-related hazard, nor do they all suffer from the same type of disease with the same symptoms. Furthermore, the inherent distinctions between individuals who suf
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