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Gray v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.1/27/2005
ld and those injured by products less than ten years old." Id. at 980. The court followed the analysis created in Collins for claims under Article I, Section 23. They first considered "whether the statute of repose is reasonably related to the inherent characteristics that define the distinction." Id. at 981. The court stated that "the statute of repose reflects the legislative determination that product failures occurring more than ten years after delivery to the first user are not fairly laid at the door of the manufacturer. It also promotes certainty and finality by limiting the exposure of manufacturers to ten years after a product is first used." Id. The court concluded that " he distinction that follows between persons injured by products less than ten years old and those injured by products more than ten years old is rationally related to serving these legislative goals and is a permissible balancing of the competing interests involved." Id.
The court next considered whether the preferential treatment accorded under Indiana Code section 34-20-3-1(b) was uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. The court began by comparing this case to Martin, and stated that " nlike the plaintiff in Martin who had an otherwise valid tort claim but was unable to discover it within the statute of limitations, the McIntoshes have never had a legally cognizable injury ." Id. at 983. The court then said, "On its face the statute applies to everyone. All citizens are prevented from accruing claims based on products in use longer than a decade. The McIntoshes belong to no subset of that class. They are treated no differently from any other person injured more than ten years after a product is first used or consumed." Id. The court concluded that the statute was uniformly applicable to all persons similarly situated, and ultimately held that it did not violate Article I, Section 23. Id. at 984.
Here, it almost goes without saying that the Occupational Diseases Act only protects those workers who come within its provisions. Baker v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 637 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (Ind. 1994). To fall within the provisions of Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1), an individual's disablement must arise within three years of his or her last work-related exposure to silica dust. Individuals who do fall within the provisions of Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1) are afforded preferential treatment in that they are permitted to file a claim with the Board seeking compensation for their disablement. Gray does not fall within the provisions of Indiana Code section 22-3-7- 9(f)(1) because Willie's disablement did not arise within three years of his last work-related exposure to silica dust. We believe that the preferential treatment afforded under Indiana Code section 22-3-7- 9(f)(1) is uniformly applicable and equally available to all employees whose disablement arises within three years after their last work- related exposure to silica dust. Likewise, individuals like Gray, who have no legally cognizable claim under Indiana Code section 22-3-7- 9(f)(1), are treated equally. Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f)(1) uniformly bars all claims from individuals whose disablement did not arise within three years of their last work-related exposure to silica dust. Gray does not belong to any subset of the class of individuals whose claims are barred because their disablement did not arise within three years of their last work-related exposure that claims to have been treated unequally. Gray has been treated no differently than any other individual whose disablement arose more than three years after their last work-related exposure to silica dust. Therefore, under Collins, the preferential treatment a
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